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Mergers are not imcommon in higher education, yet the 
phencanenon has rarely been the subject of research. Although some 
private sector combinations have been the focus of inquiry, there 
is a notable lack of study of mergers involving public 
institutions of higher education. This work concentrates on 
public sector mergers in Massachusetts for the period 1964-1985. 
The project shows that a critical dichotony in understanding the 
nature of merger exists between institutional and public 
participants in the merger process. 
At the institutional level, the focus of attention is on the 
relatively narrow matters of organizational structure and 
integrity, vdiile the makers of public policy are concerned with 
the larger issue of service to constituents. As a result of this 
disparity in perspective, institutional representatives may fail 
V 
to understand the larger public policy context of the merger 
process. Merger in the public sector is ultimately a matter of 
public policy, not just a characteristic of institutional 
development and evolution. 
Hiis historical analysis examines four separate public 
mergers: A 1964 combination of two former textile schools that 
created the present Southeastern Massachusetts University; a 1975 
merger of a technological institute (and former textile school) 
and a state college that produced the University of Lowell; a 1981 
union of an urban campus of a state university and a state college 
that expanded the IMiversity of Massachusetts at Boston, and a 
1985 consolidation of a ccanmunity college and a technical 
institute that led to a diversified Massasoit Community College. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCnC^ AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
On August 1, 1985, Massasoit Community College, Brockton, 
Massachusetts and the Blue Hills Technical Institute, Canton, 
Massachusetts were merged. Documents were signed transferring 
current and non-current assets and liabilities, title to property 
passed, corporate responsibilities changed, and lawyers earned 
their fees. Where two separate and independent institutions 
existed on July 31, a single entity, Massasoit Community College, 
was formed on August 1. It remained for the new Massasoit to 
continue under different circumstances those ongoing 
organizational processes of self-definition, establishing purpose, 
and evaluating prospects. 
It is a simple task to identify the point of merger as 
occurring on August 1, 1985. Yet the events of that day merely 
represent the legal culmination of a process started one and a 
half years earlier. 
The concept of a merger is one of common understanding. All 
who read the introductory sentence above know what happened in 
August of 1985. While familiarity with the term easily calls to 
the mind of the reader the lexical meaning of the word, 
surprisingly, this knowledge often belies a real understanding of 
the phenomenon of merger, especially in higher education, tfergers 
in higher education have rarely been the subject of research and 
study, and evaluations of public sector mergers are particularly 
scarce. Yet the occurence of a merger is a significant event in 
the lives of many people and is of material financial importance. 
The merger of Massasoit Ctoinmunity College and the Blue Hills 
Technical Institute alone involved hundreds of employees, 
thousands of students and millions of dollars. 
At the time of the merger, I was the chief fiscal and 
administrative officer at Massasoit Community College. I was 
deeply involved in all of the negotiations regarding this 
combination including not only the financial settlement, but 
personnel, programmatic and other issues. As a result, I became 
aware of the importance of the merger experience and the notable 
lack of research of the matter as well. 
This i^enomenon of merger needs to be better understood. 
What are the causes and conditions that obtain in the merger 
process? As one step toward an understanding of mergers, this 
study will focus on cases of actxial public sector itergers in 
Massachusetts higher education with a concentration on the 
Massasoit-Blue Hills union. Conceptually this study will proceed 
on two levels. Attention will be paid to those institutional 
characteristics which loom important in the merger situations 
being evaluated. Some initial generalizations will be made 
regarding these traits and the process of merger. In addition. 
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Ccureful thought will be given to the larger environment of these 
public sector mergers so that matters of public policy can 
likewise be considered. This effort will add to the pool of 
literature on the subject of merger and the findings should point 
to several areas of possible further research. 
As the merger was accomplished Massasoit Community College 
was one of fifteen state supported regional community colleges in 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. It was governed by a local 
board of trustees and was responsible to the Board of Regents of 
Higher Education vrtiich oversaw all of the Commonwealth's public 
colleges and universities. The College was funded by annual state 
appropriations as well as locally retained fees and revenue. 
The Blue Hills Technical Institute was operated under the 
auspices of the Blue Hills Regional School District, a school 
district with a vocational education mission supported by seven 
area towns. The Technical Institute was the postsecondary arm of 
the district which also operated a regional high school for grades 
nine to twelve. 
In January, 1984 the Superintendent of the Blue Hills 
Regional School District initiated discussions with the President 
of Massasoit Community College vdiich ultimately resulted in a 
merger of the two institutions. The impetus for these talks by 
the superintendent can be traced directly to the impact of 
Proposition 2 1/2 on the operation of the regional school 
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district. This 1980 state^wide referendum capped local government 
taxing authority and brought cutbacks in public services in most 
communities in the state. Proposition 2 1/2 also limited school 
district autonomy, a Massachusetts law that had previously given 
school districts considerable statutory leverage over town 
government in the annual budget process. Proposition 2 1/2 placed 
funding for schools on the same footing as all other town services 
in the competition for the local tax dollar. 
The Blue Hills operation before 1980 was supported by funds 
from the towns in the seven member school district, a modest 
tuition charge, and state aid through a formula allocation. The 
diminished local revenue and loss of school district autonomy 
created by Proposition 2 1/2 resulted in the mandate from the 
towns through the school committee that the Technical Institute 
become self-supporting. No longer woiild local funds be made 
available for the routine operation of the Institute. Tuition and 
state aid would be the source of operating funds. The vocational 
high school, however, would continue to receive local support. 
Tuition at the Technical Institute rapidly increased from 
approximately $500 a year in 1980-81 to nearly $2,500 in the 
1984-85 academic year. At the same time the tuition increases 
were levied, the Institute began an active effort to recruit and 
enroll students fr<xn outside the seven towns of the district to 
enlarge its student base. Ironically, the state formula funding 
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mechanism for regional school districts did not weigh funds from 
local appropriated sources but did factor tuition in the 
computation. The result was a decrease in the relative level of 
state aid as tuition rose. Increasing tuition charges, no local 
funding for annual operations, and decreasing state support in a 
period of declining enrollment made it clear that for the long run 
the Technical Institute could not survive as it was then 
structured. The leadership of the regional school district did, 
however, believe in the value of the Institute's programs and 
sought an alternative to closure. 
Additional state support outside of the regional district 
formula funding mechanism was considered to be the most reasonable 
opportunity. The district was successful in having a local 
legislator insert in the House budget act a separate line item 
appropriation under the budget section of the Board of Regents of 
Higher Education. While the line item won support in the House, 
opposition by the Board of Regents and a lack of support in the 
Senate and in Conference Committee finally doomed the effort. 
Further, the experience indicated that prospects for future 
success were dim. 
While additional state funding was the preferred choice of 
the regional school district in obtaining support to preserve the 
Institute, the possibility of merger with another institution was 
not unacceptable. Since the Institute was publicly supported, a 
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merger with another public institution appeared logical. Since 
the Institute awarded an associate degree, merger with a community 
college seemed most appropriate. Finally, since most of the 
towns in the regional school district are in the Massasoit 
Community College primary service area, it was a logical choice to 
consider for a possible merger. 
The two strategies were pursued simultaneously for a period. 
However, vdien the attempt to secure additional state funds failed 
for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1984, the possibility of a 
merger became more attractive and negotiations began in earnest in 
the fall of 1984. 
In an abstract sense, the major problem confronting 
administrators at Massasoit and Blue Hills was to understand each 
other and the organizational change they were pursuing. What is a 
merger? Are there historical antecedents to provide guidance in 
this situation? What are the traditions at Massasoit Community 
College? How did a regional school district enter postsecondary 
education? Are there specific issues in mergers of public 
institutions and matters of public policy to consider? Is there a 
model to follow in such merger situations? 
Mergers 
At the time the merger was being negotiated, a review of the 
literature was undertaken by administrators at Massasoit in an 
effort to understand the corporate change being sought by the two 
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institutions. Surprisingly the search revealed little material 
that could be of assistance in defining the issues in mergers. By 
far the majority of the literature dealt with private sector 
mergers of business enterprises. The focus of these studies was 
financial or economic and was concerned with markets, equities and 
stock values. In the instant absence of these market factors, 
this literature was not helpful in understanding public sector 
mergers in higher education. 
There was some literature on mergers of nonprofit 
institutions other than colleges and universities; however, this 
literature was specialized and offered little in the attempt to 
understand mergers in public higher education. The content of 
this literature was restricted to the status of hospitals and 
other nonprofit institutions with very specific missions. 
After winnowing down the literature on mergers to higher 
education there was only a small sample of material. Gail 
Chambers [1987] notes that one reason for the lack of literature 
in higher education mergers is the difference in treatment between 
business and higher education. In the private sector the term 
merger is a key descriptor and reasearch can appropriately begin 
using the term. However, merger for nonprofit organizations can 
be seen as growth or consolidation, or simply institutional 
history. As a result she found that in higher education the fact 
of merger may be discussed in detail with scant reference to 
merger in an indexing sense. 
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In reviewing the available descriptive studies of merger in 
higher education, one categorical factor emerges: The distinction 
between public and private control of the corporate educational 
enterprise is a fundamental criteria. In higher education this 
distinction is basic since the locus of corporate control varies 
substantially between the private and the public sectors. 
It was only subsequent to the Massasoit - Blue Hills merger 
that an analytical work was prepared by Gail S. Chambers in a 
doctoral dissertation at the Itoiversity of Rochester. Her 1987 
work. Merger Between Private Colleges: An Empirical Analysis, 
provides a thorough analytic study of mergers among private 
colleges in the 1970's. Ms. Chambers, too, was alarmed at the 
lack of literature regarding mergers. She felt the prospect of 
merger would more likely affect private colleges than public 
sector institutions because the nature of private college 
financial support was more tenuous. 
She was particularly concerned that there was little in the 
way of supporting generalization to guide those in the private 
sector vdio may need to consider the merger option or any of its 
less extreme corollaries. "Therefore the merger of private 
colleges was studied here in the hope that vhat could be learned 
about institutions it^rging by choice might add to the wisdom with 
v^ich mergers and other forms of cooperative ventures can be 
designed in a period of rapid change to create a more 
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usefiil and endioring higher education system" [p. 2]. While her 
focus was exclusively on the private sector, she suggests that 
understanding voluntary private college mergers may contribute to 
understanding public college mergers as well. 
Dr. Chambers chose to look quantitatively at private college 
mergers through the 1970's in an effort to determine vrtiat 
characterized the choice process vdiich ultimately resulted in 
merger. Her research question was to identify what factors would 
contribute to the probability of a successful merger. She chose 
to attempt to generalize by using a mathematical 
(axiomatic^eductive-econometric) model in this effort. 
When the actual merger cases and their 
geographic alternatives are viewed as a 
whole... we see a general pattern of 
decision characteristics in v^ich the 
institutions sort partners first 
according to certainties about debt 
structure and the risks of being 
dominated, then by more complex means. 
The possibility of getting a campus at 
bargain rates or the opportunity to 
stabilize and re-negotiate debt can make 
pairing seem more attractive in the ecurly 
stages of the merger negotiations, [p. 179] 
As one moves from consideration of debt structure and the 
possibility of one institution to dominating another financially, 
reputational differences based on degree levels (one way the 
academic community measures its own professional worth) became 
more significant. The impact of the reputational difference may 
be positive in a situation of expansion with the addition of 
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academic programs or increased efficiency, or it may be negative 
in a retrenchment situation because of duplicative academic 
programs which may threaten the participant's professional 
employment, [p. 180] 
In concluding her study of private college mergers Cliambers 
found that institutional self-interest had condensed itself into 
an identification with the general public welfare. "Regardless of 
the pressures placed on the government structure of our private 
institutions, then, v^en it comes right down to it, apparently 
they choose first, and last, to fulfill their p\jiblic trust." 
[p. 187] 
Joseidi O'Neill and Samuel Barnett (1980) have summarized the 
issues involved in the legal change of corporate status. Their 
focus was primarily on small, tuition dependent private colleges; 
however, their study of the legal description of corporate change 
appears generally applicable in all of higher education. O'Neill 
and Barnett found several major forms of corporate change: 
merger, federation, change of sponsorship, dissolution, and re¬ 
incorporation . 
In a consolidation merger, two or more corporations dissolve 
their respective legal identities and beccane a vholly new 
corporation carrying forth all the properties and obligations of 
the former corporations. A dissolution/acquisition merger 
involves an agreement under which one institution is legally 
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dissolved and its assets and liabilities are acquired with court 
approval by the surviving institution. Thus, there are two forms 
of merger, consolidation and dissolution/acquisition. 
Their findings in reviewing the legal aspects of merger are 
not inconsistent with those of Chambers: "Questions of academic 
program, faculty quality, and reputation can be resolved only 
after it is clear that a merger will not hurt the stronger 
institution financially. The bottom line will be the first 
consideration of a responsible board." [p. 28] O'Neill and 
Barnett also find a legal justification for the action in the 
notion of public trust noted by Chambers: "Trustees are, above 
all else, the holders in trust of an estate provided by others for 
the benefit of society. Consequently, their first obligation in 
law is to that estate and to the successful completion of the 
institution's mission." [p. 28] 
Institutions do not exist in isolation, interdependence and 
cooperation is the norm. It is helpful in understanding the 
notion of it^rger to conceive of a continuum of inter-institutional 
relationships: on one end would be the purchase or sale of 
products and materials from one institution by another, and on the 
other end of the continuum one would find consortia, joint 
ventures and finally, mergers. A merger, then, would represent 
the ultimate in corporate cooperation. 
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A focus on the segment of this continuum covering cooperative 
behavior and mergers would eliminate the trivial from this concept 
of continuum. On the left side of this continuum would be 
voluntary cooperation between or among institutions. These 
institutional arrangements are characterized in higher education 
by agreements for sharing facilities and/or programs, but in which 
each of the institutions would clearly retain its own identity. 
Formalized consortia would occupy the middle ground in this 
continuum where agreements of various strengths would occur. A 
formalized consortium would be of the type described by Franklin 
Patterson [1974] in Colleges in Consort as cooperative and 
service-oriented consortia. Typically these consortia 
arrangements represent institutional combinations through formal 
agreement such as the Claremont Colleges in California. 
At the right side of the continuum one would find mergers 
characterized specific and marked organizational change. 
Exairples of these would be the creation of Camegie-Mellon 
University from Carnegie Tech and the Mellon Institute and the 
merger the College of the Sacred Heart into Boston College. 
In the realm of higher education there is some specific 
literature dealing with mergers of private colleges. There is 
also the concept that a merger represents the ultimate form of 
corporate cooperation. Since it is possible to conceive of merger 
as representing one end of a continuum of inter-institutional 
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relationships, is it also possible to consider movement along this 
continuum from various types of cooperative ventures toward and 
concluding in a merger? 
Neither the Chambers' analysis nor the O'Neill and Barnett 
legal study indicate any pattern of movement from various 
cooperative ventures toward merger. Perhaps the salient element 
here is the organizational need for autonomy which may predominate 
given the lack of financial considerations. Franklin Patterson 
found in 1974 that cooperative consortia did not tend to develop 
into more significant joint educational planning and operation: 
"Even in the best of these (cooperative consortia) institutional 
autonomy and self-interest remains the predominate pattern, and 
cooperative patterns appear thin." [p. 28] Patterson's 
observation in his study of cooperative consortia appears to be 
confirmed in the applicable literature regarding mergers. 
Earlier it was noted that the literature with mergers as the 
primary focus in higher education is scarce. There are a number 
of articles available idiich are essentially descriptive and in 
vdiich there is no attempt to generalize. Many of these could be 
catergorized as "how to" works. They are usually based on 
specific mergers and the authors provide a laundry list of items 
to be considered for those considering a merger. There is nothing 
in these descriptive works vdiich places the experience reported in 
any greater context. It remains for the reader to determine which 
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characteristics on the list are idiosyncratic and which are 
applicable to the sitiiation at hand. These works may be useful as 
a data base for preparing generalizations, but in and of 
themselves are of little abstract use. Exanples of this genre 
include several chapters in a text edited by Asa Knowles [1970] as 
well as an article by Hugh L. Thompson [1985], "Considering a 
Merger?" 
Of those works v^ch are considered generally descriptive, 
one in particular looms large. A 1976 book by John D. Millett 
entitled Mergers in Higher Education: An Analysis of Ten Case 
Studies was an effort to review a variety of mergers to identify 
commonalities among them. It is not an analytic work in the sense 
that an attempt is made to place these mergers in a larger 
context; however, the conclusions Millett draws are most helpful 
in any study of mergers. Millett's stijdy is significant also 
because it represents the only published book in general 
circulation available as a study of mergers in higher education. 
In the ten cases Millett studied during the 1970's, five were 
mergers of private institutions and five were mergers of public 
institutions. He chose the institutions studied to represent the 
variety of merger ejqserience in higher education. 
It is significant that Millett's conclusion, as was Chambers' 
and O'Neill and Barnett's, established the essential motivation 
for merger as financial: "In every instance we have studied. 
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financial concems were a major reason for moving toward merger, 
but the financial concems were not necessarily those of an 
immediate income - expenditure gap. The financial concern might 
arise from a determination to achieve greater financial strength 
for a combined institution than was possible for a each 
institution separately." [p. 9] If there is a common thread in 
the literature of mergers, it is that financial concems represent 
a precipitating factor in movement toward merger. 
Millett finds other factors involved in merger as well. 
Geographic proximity, for example, was inportant in considerations 
of merger. "Geography is more than a matter of location. 
Geography is also the formalized basis of political representation 
in the American structure of government." [p. 14] In 
consideration of public sector mergers the political 
representation factor is not to be lightly regarded. The 
geographic factor is also characteristic of institutions of higher 
education in the United States. There are somehow local even if 
they have a national reputation. Harvard is a Cambridge, 
Massachusetts institution in spite of its enrollment of students 
from around the world and its dispersion of graduates throughout 
the lAiited States and the world. The authorization to award 
degrees resides at the state level, and perhaps for that reason 
colleges and universities are all in that sense local. 
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Earlier it was suggested that there is a continuum of inter- 
institutional relationships from cooperative ventures to merger. 
Millett finds that a pattern of cooperation could possibly have 
some influence in encouraging an eventual merger of two 
institutions, although what that influence might be was 
problemmatical. Of his ten case studies, there was soitte evidence 
of cooperation in four but no evidence of cooperation in six 
instances. He found no definitive movement along a continuum from 
cooperation toward merger in the several instances where there was 
evidence of cooperation prior to the merger event. 
Millett also found that other factors were prominent in the 
decision to merge: The movement frcsn education for women to co¬ 
education, variations in program emphasis, and qualitative 
considerations in a movement toward academic excellence. These 
characteristics, however, appear to be significant in certain 
specific institutional instances and were not generalizable. 
Regarding merger in the public sector, however, he finds that 
political interests are iirportant: "It is reasonable to 
generalize that any merger involving state government funding or 
state government legislative action is necessarily a merger made 
possible only political considerations involving the various 
parties to the transaction. Governmental action is politics, and 
mergers of higher educational institutions sometimes can and do 
involve governmental action" [pp. 22-23]. 
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Of all the issues in merger, Millett stresses again that 
financial considerations are at the base of mergers, both public 
and private. "But underneath, or inherent in, any consideration 
of merger is some particular financial concern, and some 
particular calculation of financial benefit" [p. 23]. He finds 
that of all the forces available in movement toward merger, 
finances represent the final and determining influence. 
In Millett's study two factors regarding the movement toward 
merger in the public sector appear salient: financial 
considerations and politics. While Millett notes the iirportance 
of governmental action and, hence, political action, he seems 
consider political action only as a means to resolve financial 
problems. That is, he does not appear to consider the larger 
issue of public policy in the merger of public institutions. 
His focus on institutions rather than public policy is 
reflected in his summary of the major purposes of the mergers he 
studied: 
* To obtain support for the \irban mission of previously 
independent univerisites 
To strengthen quality 
' To consolidate complimentary institutions in the 
interest of more economical operation and unified 
management 
* To meet financial difficulties and to liquidate debts 
* To preserve some identity of a caitpus and academic 
operation [p. 53] 
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Summary 
Millett's study, v^le very helpful, is essentially 
descriptive. The perspective is quite institution oriented, as if 
these institutions were not part of a larger segment of higher 
education either at the state or national level. It was noted 
earlier that mergers in the business sector are influenced by the 
larger context of the economic environment and market forces in 
v^ich those institutions exist. In a review of the literature of 
mergers in public higher education there appears to be no specific 
consideration of the larger context within which these 
institutions exist. 
In this study of the merger of Massasoit Community College 
and the Blue Hills Technical Institute it will be necessary to 
study other public sector mergers in the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts. To that end the focus of Chapter Two will be two 
mergers. First is the merger of two textile institutes vrtiich 
ultimately resulted in Southeastern Massachusetts University. The 
second merger is the combination of Lowell State College and 
Lowell Technological Institute vrtiich brought about the University 
of Lowell. Both of these mergers were completed prior to creation 
of the Massachusetts Board of Regents of Higher Education in 1981. 
Immediately after the creation of the Board of Regents of 
Higher Education came the nerger of Boston State College and the 
Ikiiversity of Massacdiusetts at Boston into the expanded University 
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of Massachusetts at Boston, which will be the focus of Chapter 
Three in this study. Chapter Four will cover the merger of 
Massasoit Community College and the Blue Hills Technical 
Institute. The concluding chapter will provide an informal 
analysis and observations arising from this study of public sector 
mergers. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MASSACHUSETTS MERGERS, 1964 AND 1975 
Introduction 
Mergers in public higher education in the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts occurred in 1964, 1975, 1981, and 1984. The mergers 
that occurred in 1964 and 1975 involved combinations of contiguous 
institutions with canplimentary purposes. These institutions had 
their origins in the late 19th century. 
In the 1890's the textile industry was a prominent econcMidc 
activity in Massachusetts. There were two major areas of 
activity: southeastern and northeastern Massachusetts. The mills 
in southeastern Massachusetts were primarily concerned with cotton 
textiles vdiile those in northeastern Massachusetts chiefly 
concentrated on the woolen textile industry. 
At the initiation of the local ccmimunities, three textile 
schools were formed to support the area industry. The New Bedford 
Textile School, Bradford-Durfee Textile School (Fall River), and 
the Textile School at Lowell were established through the 
authority provided in acts of the Legislature. These institutions 
were originally supported and funded by the local communities; 
however, state operational support quickly followed and soon 
outpaced local contributions to the budget of each institution. 
These institutions had as the reason for their existence a highly 
specific textile manufacturing related curriculum. As the 
textile industry began its withdrawal from M^sachxisetts, these 
schools began to diversify their educational offerings. The 
textile schools originally awarded diplomas, but as the years 
rolled by they started awarding three year certificates and 
finally four year baccalaureate degrees. As the institutions 
became less directly related to the textile industry and more a 
part of traditional higher education, their existence distinct 
from the mainstream of public higher education in the Commonwealth 
became problematic. 
At the same time the textile schools were created, there was 
also an expansion of the state normal school system for teacher 
training. In 1894 the state normal school at Lowell was 
authorized by the Legislature, and its doors were opened in 
October, 1897. The institution offered a two year program in 
elementary education but its curriculum expanded several times 
over the next eight decades. The state normal schools were 
authorized in 1932 to confer a baccalaureate degree, and the naites 
of the institutions were changed from normal schools to state 
teachers colleges. In 1960 the institutions were renamed state 
colleges and were provided with an es^panded mission of providing 
programs in research, extension and continuing education and in 
the liberal, fine and applied arts and sciences through the 
masters degree level. 
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These textile schools and the state college in Lowell were 
involved in the first major mergers of pijblic institutions of 
higher education in the Ccanmonwealth. In 1964 the Southeastern 
Massachusetts Technological Institute was created by the 
combination of the New Bedford Textile School and the Bradford- 
Durfee Textile School. In 1975 the University of Lowell was 
created by the combination of Lowell State College and the Lowell 
Technological Institute. 
Southeastern Massachusetts University (1964) 
Walter J. Cass [1967] provides a substantial report of the 
history of the creation of vdiat is now known as the Southeastern 
Massachusetts University (SMU) in his cultural perspective of the 
contribution of the institution to the development in the area. 
The institution was originally called the Southeastern 
Massachusetts Technological Institute (SMIT) ^en it was formed in 
1964. 
The Bradford-Durfee Textile School was created to give 
instruction in textile manufacturing. The city of Fall River was 
the primary source of financial support from its origins until 
1918 when the Commonwealth of Massachusetts assumed the principal 
financial support of the institution. Governance from 1918 until 
the merger in 1964 was by a Board of Trustees of fifteen members 
appointed by the Governor for three year terms and three 
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ex officio members (Commissioner of Education, Mayor of Fall 
River, and Superintendent of Fall River Public Schools). From 
1918 ^en the Commonwealth eissumed title to school property and 
carried the financial burden, the city of Fall River provided 
$10,000 a year for the support of the school until the date of 
merger. 
The curriculum at Bradford-Durfee Textile School included a 
three year couorse in general cotton manufactviring, a two year 
course in designing and weaving, as well as a two year course in 
chemistry and dyeing. In 1946 the textile school became the 
Bradford-Durfee Technical Institute and in 1955 it was renamed the 
Bradford-Durfee College of Technology. As Cass notes, "The 
changes in name reflect the changes in educational function that 
the school was undergoing. The courses in machine shop, 
electricity, and mill construction had slowly, through the years, 
developed into mechaniccd., electrical, and civil engineering. The 
courses in dyeing and finishing developed into a chemistry 
department" [p. 87]. The primeury inpetus for this development 
from a curriculum stan^)oint had to do with the specific nature of 
the training at the school. It proved difficult to separate the 
teaching of textile machine design from general machine design, 
hence creating the tendency toward generalization vrtiich is 
reflected in this change of the school's status in the 1940's and 
1950's. 
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Of course much of this change in the educational offering of 
Bradford-Durfee can be traced to the migration of the cotton 
textile industry from southeastern Massachusetts to the southern 
United States. Cass, however, suggests that these changes would 
have occurred even if the textile indiistry had remained strong in 
the history of Fall River. "The old concept of the textile 
colorest held until the introduction of sophisticated dyes and 
finishes by Dupont and other chemical conpanies" [p. 88]. The 
application of colors to textiles thus became more a matter of the 
science of chemistry than a matter for tradesmen mixing certain 
standard materials in a way which would produce a desired effect. 
Bradford-Durfee's movement toward collegiate status is best 
reflected in its effort to receive full accreditation. Through 
the 1940 *s and 1950's the institution developed a curriculum 
beyond textiles to include major fields of study in engineering, 
mathematics, chemistry, business administration, and graphic arts. 
In addition a humanities department Wcis developed and a new 
science building with appropriate laboratories was completed in 
1955. These activities "...moved toward a more generalized, 
theoretical education and away from a specific, job centered, 
vocational education" [Cass, p. 100]. The Bradford-Durfee 
College of Technology applied to the New England Association of 
Schools and Colleges (NEASC) for accreditation in June of 1961 and 
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was evaluated that fall. In December of 1961 the NEASC notified 
the institution of its successful accreditation. 
The New Bedford Institute of Technology also applied for and 
received accreditation from the New England Association of Schools 
and Colleges. The history of the New Bedford Textile School 
through 1964 was quite similar to that of the Bradford-Durfee 
Textile School. The purpose of the New Bedford Textile School Wcis 
to provide teaching for the manufacture of cotton textiles. The 
New Bedford school was created by an act of the Massachusetts 
Legislature in 1895 and in 1918 became a state institution, as did 
the Bradford-Durfee Textile School. In 1918 the Commonwealth 
assumed financial responsibility for the support of the sdiool 
while the city of New Bedford continued to contribute $10,000 a 
year to its support through 1964. The institution was governed by 
a seventeen (17) member board of trustees with fifteen (15) 
appointed by the Governor and two (2) ex officio members, the 
Mayor of New Bedford and the New Bedford Superintendent of 
Schools. The board of trustees was e5q>anded several years later 
to include the Commissioner of Education as an ex officio number. 
The curriculum at the New Bedford Textile School reflected 
the organization of a cotton mill and the craft-oriented trades of 
the time. The school had four departments: the cotton carding 
and spinning department, the warp preparation and weaving 
department, the design departit^nt, and the mechanical drawing 
25 
department [Cass, p. 119]. The curriculum remained substantively 
in place as late as 1947. 
In the years immediately following World War II the New 
Bedford Textile School changed as did the Bradford-Durfee School. 
The New Bedford Textile School underwent name dianges similar to 
those of Bradford-Durfee reflecting changes in the purpose of the 
institution. Until 1949 the institution was referred to as New 
Bedford Textile School. The New Bedford Textile Institute was its 
title in 1950, and in 1955 it became the New Bedford Institute of 
Tfextiles and Technology. Textiles was dropped from its title in 
1957 when it became the New Bedford Institute of Technology. 
The name changes here reported suggest that 
the New Bedford School in its last years of 
independence and existence tried to remain 
loyal at least to the technology if not 
textile designation of its original 
institutional goals. The word "college" 
in Bradford-Durfee's name suggests a 
more academically oriented approach to 
essentially the same area of education. 
This seems to be a fair assessment of 
differences in aim of the two institutions 
in practice. In its later years. New 
Bedford Institute of Technology continued 
a close relationship with industry and 
tended to view many of its courses, even 
after becoming a degree granting institution, 
"training for industry." Probably because 
Fall River had been more thoroughly deserted 
indxistry than had New Bedford, 
Bradford-Durfee seen^d to move more in the 
direction of a collegiate, i.e., 
non-technologic education. [Cass, pp. 122-123] 
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To the detached observer, the two textile schools in Fall 
River and New Bedford appear quite similar in their purposes. In 
addition, although they were founded on local initiative, their 
operational support came from the larger political arena, the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. There was little cooperative 
interaction between the two institutions just as there was little 
cooperation between the two cities which have historically 
maintained a healthy rivalry. 
Movement toward merger occurred in 1947 when a bill to 
consolidate the two schools was introduced into the state 
legislature. "The object of the bill was to avoid the continued 
costly duplication of facilities, machines, faculty, and courses 
in two similar state institutions only 16 miles apart" [Cass, 
p. 86]. The bill was sponsored by the State Commission on 
Adminstration and Finance and the State Auditor in an effort to 
reduce the cost of state government. Local opposition in the 
legislature defeated the bill. However, the concept remained 
alive in state administrative circles. 
The effort to merge Bradford-Durfee College and New Bedford 
Institute of Technology began in earnest with Governor Foster 
Furcolo's Special Message to the legislature on July 1, 1958. In 
addition to proposing the merger of these two institutions, the 
Governor more broadly advocated the establishment of two year 
community colleges, the expansion of the University of 
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Massachusetts at Amherst, and the enlargement of the State 
Teachers' Colleges. The Governor's Special Message was a 
comprehensive plan for the e3q>ansion of public higher education in 
the Commonwealth. 
In the proposal to merge the two textile schools, the 
Governor clearly rejected separate e3q>ansion of these two 
complimentary institutions which were also geographically close to 
each other. It simply made no sense from the state perspective to 
support e3q>ansion of these schools separately. 
Opposition to the Governor's plan did emerge in both cities. 
In one sense there was the traditional loyalty of the New Bedford 
and Fall River areas to their local schools. It cannot be 
overlooked that these institutions were created at local 
initiative and were sustained through their history by some local 
financial support. The Board of Trustees consisted of local 
citizens and scholarships were provided to promising students from 
the area. Local pride must be considered in the context of the 
traditional New Bedford - Fall River inter-city rivalry which 
historically stood in the way of any cooperative efforts between 
the cities. These issues set the tone for the opposition v^ich 
also included a healthy mistrust of state government. 
Southeastern Massachusetts has traditionally felt itself 
slighted hy state initiatives. Indeed, Walter J. Cass associates 
the fate of the area with its distance from center of power in 
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Boston, Massachusetts. "Southeastern Massachusetts has learned to 
expect that Boston and vicinity consume the lion's share of state 
aid on all projects, educational or otherwise, and that after 
Boston, the Worcester and North Shore areas of the state have 
priority. The leftovers, if any, are allocated to southeastern 
Massachusetts. The combined annual budgets of New Bedford Textile 
School and Bradford-Durfee Textile School never equalled the 
annual budgets of Lowell" [p. 76]. 
The Governor had to build a political consensus for his 
proposal. At one point in the debate over the consolidation of 
the two textile schools, an alternative was proposed to make one 
of the institutions (Bradford-Durfee) a two year college and 
expand the New Bedford Institution. This met with considerable 
opposition but appeared to focus the political debate in a 
direction preferred by the Governor. 
The options available at the local level appeared to be to 
continue the present separate institutional arrangements with no 
e3q>ansion, e3q>ansion which included the creation of a two year 
college by one, or the acceptance of a consolidated institution as 
orginally proposed by the Governor. The Governor's proposal of 
two alternatives with highly negative implications appeared to 
focus group support for the consolidation plan of creating a 
Southeastern Massachusetts Technological Institute. After 
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establishing this Hobson's choice, the Governor commented that he 
would accede to local interests. 
Local proponents of a merger participated in the effort to 
build popular support for the creation of a university. William 
C. Wild, then a faculty member and Special Assistant to the 
President at Bradford Durfee, and now Executive Vice President at 
SMU, notes that people had to be sold on the merits of the issue. 
Dr. Wild, along with a member of New Bedford's Board of Trustees, 
would speak at local functions such as PTA and service club 
meetings citing the advantages of merger and the disadvantages of 
failure to merge. He recalls that Governor Furcolo's Special 
^fessage propelled the idea of merger to center stage, but that 
local pride had to be assuaged. 
Local support was high for each institution because of long 
term ties to each ccanmunity. It was not insignificant that each 
Board of Trustees was cotrposed of local citizens, that 
institutional scholarships were awarded to local students, and 
that each community consistently contributed $10,000 annually to 
the budget of the institutions through good financial times and 
bad. The theme stressed by Dr. Wild and others was the broadening 
of educational opportunity for area students beyond textiles and 
related engineering programs. The prospect of expanded 
educational opportunity, sounded by Governor Furcolo, proved 
compelling in overcoming local resistance and the 
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New Bedford-Fall River inter-city rivalry. [William C. Wild, 
personal communication, March 6, 1989] 
The Governor built a consensus for a consolidated institution 
so that on March 10, 1960, at a joint meeting of the Board of 
Trustees, the two textile schools agreed to campaign for a 
consolidated institution. In a May, 1960 Special Message to the 
Legislature the Governor asked for an appropriation for the 
establishment of Southeastern Massachusetts Technological 
Institute. The bill was referred to the Joint Committee on 
Education in the legislature vdiich approved the bill and referred 
it for action. The bill received the support of both houses and 
was signed by the Governor on July 8, 1960. 
The 1960 action by the legislature ultimately resulted in the 
merger of the two textile schools and the creation of Southeastern 
Massachusetts Technological Institute in July, 1964. The new 
institution was to be located on a new campus in North Dartmouth, 
Massachusetts, midway between Fall River and New Bedford. 
An assessment of the precipitating factors in the merger and 
creation of Southeastern Massachusetts University must first 
incliide the dominant influence of Governor Foster Furcolo. It was 
the Governor's intiative to ejqpand public higher education in 
order to provide greater educational opportunity throughout the 
state which brought about the merger of the two textile schools. 
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The combination was one aspect of his effort to e:5>and the 
Commonwealth's public higher education commitment. 
The merger of these two textile schools, only 16 miles apart 
with duplicative programs, made estimable public policy sense. 
From a financial perspective, there was no coirpelling need for the 
Commonwealth to conffnit funds for the expansion of either of these 
institutions. The Governor made it clear in establishing the 
organizational alternatives to the local area that if they were to 
ride the crest of expanding public higher education in the state, 
they could do so in the manner prescribed in his special message. 
Care should be taken, however, in assigning too much weight 
in the push toward merger of the two institutions to the factual 
circumstance of conplimentary programs and geographic proximity. 
Recently Governor Furcolo suggested that the notion of access to 
public higher education by citizens of the area was key. He 
suggested that southeastern Massachusetts had been neglected by 
the state in general and specifically in regard to public higher 
education. What choice other than education for the textile 
industry did an area high school graduate have? There were no 
local public higher education options available to area students 
other than the two schools. If a student did not want to pursue a 
textile or technical related career, there was no opportunity in 
the area. In his Special Message of 1958 he purposefully provided 
for an expansion of educational opportunity in southeastern 
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Massachusetts, not the elimination of duplicative institutions. 
Public policy, it seems, was the logic behind the events that led 
to the creation of SMU [Foster G. Furcolo, personal communication, 
January 25, 1989]. 
The issues in the creation of the merger, then, can be traced 
directly to Governor Furcolo’s policy intiatives as well as the 
geographical proximity of the two institutions with conplimentary 
programs. Students were pleased with the proposal since the 
combination of the institutions would lead to a four year entity 
of greater prestige. All personnel at the two institutions were 
by statute provided with the right to be ertployees of the newly 
consolidated entity and all property in the possession of the two 
institutions separately would be deeded to the new SMIT. 
Governance, too, was established in the 1960 statute in a way that 
gave equal representation to the two communities. 
Earlier noted was a proposition concerning a continuum of 
inter-organizational cooperation. In this instance of merger 
there seems to be no movement along a continuum of inter- 
institutional cooperation. That is, there were no progressive 
stages of cooperative effort that preceded the iterger of the two 
institutions. From separate and duplicative institutions with 
little interaction came a single university. 
University of Lowell (1975) 
Lowell State College and the Lowell Technological Institute 
were merged in July of 1975 as a result of legislation enacted in 
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1973. Until this combination these two institutions existed just 
one mile apart in the city of Lowell trcm the time of their 
developonnent in the 1890's. 
Lowell State College was one of eleven insitutions in the 
Massachusetts State College System, all of which were founded 
before 1900, nine of them as normal schools. An 1838 act of the 
legislature authorized the State Board of Education to establish 
three normal schools in different geographic locations of the 
state. The present Framingham, Westfield, and Bridgewater State 
Colleges all trace their existence to this original legislation. 
The Normal School at Lowell opened its doors in 1897. 
The Massachusetts State College System also included two 
specialized colleges. The Massachusetts College of Art (1873) was 
the first normal art school in the United States and the 
Massachusetts Maritime Academy (1891) was founded to provide 
officers for the U.S. Iferchant Marine. Both of these 
institutions were governed by a separate Board of Trustees. 
In 1909, the nine Normal Schools were placed under the direct 
supervision of the State Department of Education. They were 
authorized to grant the Bachelor of Education Degree in 1921 and 
the Bachelor of Science in Education in 1922. In 1932 these 
Normal Schools were formally designated State Teachers Colleges. 
In 1935 they were authorized to confer the Master of Education 
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degree, the principal degree offered by Lowell State College at 
the time of merger. 
During the 1950's, a number of studies of academic programs 
at the Massachusetts State Teachers Colleges recommended the 
development of a broader curricula and the construction of more 
physical facilities. In 1960 the colleges were renamed State 
Colleges as they began to diversify fields of study. Bachelor 
degree programs in most of the liberal arts and several 
porofessional areas were implemented as result of the 
recommendation to diversify. 
The curriculum at Lowell State College reflected this 
movement toward diversification, although it retained its 
historical emphasis on music education. By 1972 the College 
continued to offer three teaching programs in Elementary, Music, 
and Secondary Education and baccalaureate degrees in sixteen 
programs: American Studies, Art, Biology, English, Environmental 
Sciences, French, History, Mathematics, Medical Technology, Modem 
Languages, Music, Nursing, Philosophy, Political Science, 
Psychology, and Sociology. Masters degree programs were available 
in teaching programs only. 
Through 1964, the State Board of Education served as the 
Board of Trustees for the Massachusetts State Colleges. The 
College of Art and the Maritime Academy accreted to the State 
College System under the Board of Education in 1964. The 
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Willis-Harrington Act of 1965 conpletely reorganized piablic 
education in Massachusetts. The 1965 Act placed the eleven 
colleges under the authority of an autonomous governing board, the 
Board of Trustees of the State Colleges, effective on January 25, 
1966. This segmental Board of Trustees provided the primary 
oversight of Lowell State College from 1966 until July 1, 1975, 
the date of merger with Lowell Technological Institute. 
The Lowell Textile School also opened its doors in 1897 for 
the purpose of teaching textile technology subjects. The 
historical development of the Lowell Textile School closely 
parallels that of the Bradford Durfee and New Bedford Textile 
Schools in southeastern Massachusetts. The Lowell Textile School 
was authorized originally to award diplomas and certificates and 
in 1913 was granted the additional permission to confer four year 
degrees in engineering and textile chemistry. As with its 
southeastern Massachusetts counterparts, the Lowell Textile School 
came under the control and management of a Board of Trustees 
appointed by the Governor in 1918 vrtien the school property and 
operational support became the responsibility of the Commonwealth. 
The name of the institution was changed in 1928 to the Lowell 
Textile Institute. 
The Lowell Textile Institute expanded its degree programs 
through the late 1940's and the early 1950's to a much broader 
science based curriculum. There were degree programs in 
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Biological Science, Business Administration, Oiemical Engineering, 
Civil Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Industrial Management 
and Technology, Mathematics, Mechanical Engineering, Meteorology, 
Nuclear Engineering, Physics, Plastics, and Radiological Health 
Physics. This e^qpanded curriculum lead to another name change in 
1953 to the Lowell Technological Institute. Hie Institute offered 
Associate Degrees in Business Administration, Bachelor of Science, 
Master of Mathematics for teachers and Doctor of Philosophy 
degrees. 
The Lowell Technological Institute received generally greater 
si^port from the Commonwealth than the two textile schools in 
southeastern Massachusetts. Of the three schools, Lowell became 
most famous and earned a notable reputation originally as a 
technical school associated with the textiles and later as a 
teaching and research center related to the development of 
industry around the city of Boston. [Cass, p. 75] 
Just as the merger that created Southeastern Massachusetts 
lAiiversity was primarily the result of public policy initiatives 
at the state level, the impetus for the creation of the University 
of Lowell came from the state level, this time from the State 
Legislature. A special commission was established by Chapter 79 
of the Resolves of 1972 to make an investigation and study 
relative to the feasibility of merging the Lowell Technological 
Institute of Massachusetts and the State College at Lowell. As a 
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result of this legislation, a merger study team was put together 
and the Academy for Educational Development was hired as a 
consulting firm to prepare a study on the feasiblity of merging 
the two institutions. This study was coirpleted in December of 
1972. This report of the special commission relative to the 
feasibility of merging the Lowell Technological Institute of 
Massachiisetts and the State College at Lowell was approved in 
legislation enacted in 1973 and resulted in the iterger of the two 
institutions on July 1, 1975. 
At the time of the legislation which created the University 
of Lowell, Lowell State College was an institution that 
historically provided teacher education with an enphasis on music, 
but vdiich had been adding degree programs in various liberal arts 
subjects. The Lowell Technological Institute was an entity vrtiich 
built on its technical textile foundation to emphasize engineering 
subjects as well as business administration and science. Both 
Lowell State and Lowell Tech were part of the Massachusetts state 
system of higher education financed primarily by appropriations by 
the state legislature. Lowell State College was one part of the 
state college system cind the Lowell Technological Institute had 
its own separate Board of Trustees. 
These two institutions with their complimentary programs were 
located just over a mile apart in Lowell, Massachusetts. 
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Throughout the history of both institutions there was little 
evidence of cooperative efforts between them. 
Joan Bartczak Cannon [1977] notes that each institution 
developed its own unique institutional identity. She reports that 
the idea of the merger had been discussed unofficially for several 
decades, "...its initial impetus can be traced to 1969 vdien a 
state representative from the local community submitted a bill 
calling for the merger of these institutions." 
State Representative Paul J. Sheehy [personal communication, 
February 6, 1989] and Lowell Technological Institute President, 
Dr. Everett Olsen [personal communication, February 17, 1989] 
provide an anecdotal explanation of the moving force behind the 
idea of a merger. Charley Sampas wrote a "Saiipas Scoopies" column 
for the Lowell Sun at the time and often wrote that it would be 
great for Lowell if the State College and Technological Institute 
merged to create a university. The story is not apocryphal for 
Representative Sheehy vho reports that the Saitpas column made him 
feel the idea was a good one. Representative Sheehy filed the 
1972 legislation that ultimately resulted in the merger that 
created the University of Lowell. 
There is little evidence that either institution vigorously 
supported or encouraged the act of merger. Indeed, a 1972 
academic program master plan for the State College system in 
Massachusetts fails to comment upon even the possibility of Lowell 
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state College becoming a part of a newly created University of 
Lowell. The master plan and the legislatively mandated 
feasibility study were contenporaneously prepared, the former was 
completed in November, 1972 and the latter in December, 1972. The 
impetus for merger in this instance, then, emerges from a state¬ 
wide perspective and not from either the systemic Board of State 
Colleges or frcan the Board of Trustees of Lowell Technological 
Institute. 
■Hiere were two institutions of higher learning financed by 
the State located in the city of Lowell. These fundamental 
circumstances call to mind those characteristics that earlier led 
to the creation of Southeastern Massachusetts University. A 
common source of financial support for the institutions, 
geographical proximity, and the complimentary nature of the 
academic programs at the institutions represented a primary 
rationale behind the introduction of the legislation to create the 
lAiiversity of Lowell. 
In a recent conversation Representative (now Senator) Sheehy 
emphasized a theme that also calls to mind the discussion of 
merger at SMU: educational opportunity. He suggests that Lowell 
people of limited means, working people, could become teachers or 
engineers but nothing else. In the early 1970's jobs and career 
opportunities in both areas were limited. The whole reason for 
the existence of public higher education is the opportunity for 
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students to make their lives better. A university in Lowell would 
provide many more educational opportunities for the citizens of 
Lowell than would the separate State College and Technological 
Institute [Paul J. Sheehy, personal communication, February 6, 
1989]. 
The merger study team created as a result of the March, 1972 
legislation hired the Academy for Educational Developnnent (A.E.D.) 
to construct a team of consultants under its auspices to evaluate 
the possibility of merger. The consultants were instructed to 
consider the feasibility of merging the two institutions, to point 
out the principal advantages and drav^backs of such an action, and 
to identify the main considerations that would be involved in 
carrying out a merger in the event that this was the course of 
action decided upon. 
Ihe merger study team ccarpleted its assignment promptly with 
the acceptance of the consultants' report and summarized its 
findings in a report prepared by the Academy for Educational 
Developoodent sxjbmitted to the Legislature in December, 1972. This 
report brought the issue of merger to the fore and resulted in the 
filing of merger legislation in January of 1973. 
The study team was unanimous in its agreement that Lowell 
State College and Lowell Technological Institute should be merged 
into a new University of Lowell. 
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The basic reason for this recommendation 
is the firm conviction that the greater 
Lowell community would be better served 
from an educational point of view by the 
comprehensive university that would result 
in the merger, than it could possibly be 
served if the two institutions went their 
own independent way. A merger would make 
much better use of the total resources, 
both physiceO. and intellectual, would make 
it possible to meet community needs more 
effectively, and would avoid the costly 
duplicated and destructive rivalry that 
would otherwise be almost certain to 
develop over the years. [A.E.D., p. 17] 
The study team felt that while the future may hold cost 
savings through more efficient utilization of plant and faculty, 
there would be no immediate cost reduction. Hiere would in the 
short run still be the necessity to operate two locations and to 
maintain the same facilities and, in their view, to continue the 
existing student/faculty ratios. 
The report included a concluding thought regarding an 
alternative to merger: cooperation. It raised the questions. Why 
merge? Why not just cooperate? "The answer is that without 
unified leadership that gives overriding priority to the creation 
of an organization that consolidates the operations of the 
individual institutions, nothing much that is new will happen. 
Hiese two institutions have lived side-by-side for seventy-five 
years, and during this time under different leadership been quite 
content to go their independent ways with negligible cooperation. 
If a unified coordinated operation is wanted, the way to get is to 
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imify the institution in actual fact_" [A.E.D., p. 37]. The 
answer to the question calls to mind Franklin Patterson's 
observations regarding the autonomous and independent nature of 
institutions of higher education. 
The study team found little different to enphasize in its 
recommendation than Representative Sheehy had noted earlier and 
that was contained in the popular discussion of the preceding 
several decades. Ihose favorable circumstances leading toward 
merger were geographical proximity and the complimentary nature of 
the academic programs in state funded institutions. The study 
team downplayed the financial aspect of a merger but the prospect 
of economies produced by a single administration and support 
operation as enrollment grew held out the prospect of future 
financial advantage. Thus, while programmatic and public policy 
issues were paramount in the consultants’ report, finances too 
represented a consideration. 
Dr. Everett Olsen recollects that he and the late Lowell 
State College President Daniel O'Leary were supporters of the 
merger v^en it became apparent that it was inevitable. Dr. Olsen 
recognized that as the compelling force behind merger became 
educational opportunity, it was appropriate to go along with the 
concept. Local institutional issues of importance such as 
salaries and job security suddenly appeared parochial in a context 
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of greater educational opportunity [Dr. Everett Olsen, personal 
cxstnmunication, February 17, 1989]. 
The A.E.D. report did not end merely with a recommendation 
for merger. It also included considerations to be made in 
effecting a merger of the two colleges and recommended the 
creation of a merger planning board. Three of the suggestions 
offered related to the nature of the merger: It should be a 
marriage of equals with neither teacher education nor technology 
dominating. It should be a merger in fact and not a paper 
combination where a common chief executive oversees two 
independent canpuses. Finally, since Lowell State reported to a 
segmental Board of Trustees, it was further recommended that the 
separate Lowell Tech Board of Trustees be reconstituted to solve 
the problems in creating a truly unified university [A.E.D., 
pp. 19-20]. 
Summary 
In 1964 two former textile schools were combined to form 
Southeastern Massachusetts University and in 1975 a former textile 
school and a state college were merged to create the University of 
Lowell. There appear no salient characteristics intrinsic to the 
four institutions that created a predisposition for merger. The 
academic performance of each institution was adequate, each was 
following a reasonable pattern of curricular evolution, there were 
no financial or operational problems threatening institutional 
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survival, and each college had an administration, faculty, 
students, and trustees generally satified with the status quo. If 
each institution is considered separately, as a discrete entity, 
it is likely that little change would have occurred, save for 
continued evolution. 
Perhaps a question will clarify the point: If one of the 
institutions in each of the merger situations had not existed 
would there have been substantive corporate change of equivalent 
importance to merger? The answer appears to be no. The textile 
schools were evolving into technological institutes worthy of 
public support and were attracting students in sufficient numbers 
to justify continued development. The state college was emerging 
as a liberal arts college in concert with the other state colleges 
and this mission change broxight continued public support and 
attracted students in growing numbers. No internal constituency 
at any of the four institutions clamored for substantive 
organizational change, including merger. 
The impetus for merger appears to be environmental. All four 
of the institutions were part of a system of public education and 
it was the relationship of each institution to one another and to 
the system as a vhole that precipitated merger. The logic is 
related to the development of public policy and the availability 
of public higher educational opportunity. 
45 
Each of the institutions drew its operational financial 
support from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. It is not 
surprising that the mergers were stimulated at the state level by 
the Governor's Office and the Legislature. Institutions of public 
higher education in the Commonwealth have a great deal of 
operational autonomy and function in a manner separate from other 
segments of state government. In addition, the public colleges 
and universities identify with their educational mission as a part 
of the larger world of higher education, with other public and 
private colleges and universities, rather than other arms of state 
government. State government in this context represents more of a 
source of operating and capital funds. The identification with 
the education profession may have resulted in a satisfaction with 
the status quo that was appropriate; however, the perspective from 
the State House was quite different. 
It is in regard to public finances that geographic proximity 
is likewise considered. As long as there was a textile school and 
a normal school, the distinct missions made it acceptable for 
separate institutions to exist one mile apart. The existence of 
nearty institutions with a caramon mission of supporting the 
textile industry in southeastern Massachusetts was acceptable as 
well because of its contribution to the local area's economy. As 
the missions of these institutions began to converge over time, 
the public esqjenditure issue became tied to the larger question of 
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the support of public higher education. The circumstance of 
geographical proximity then became more important. Why should the 
public support two separate complimentary institutions of higher 
education it«rely one mile or only sixteen miles apart? 
Yet there is something beyond the irere facts of geography, 
professional identification and a common source of support that 
appears significant here. A public policy of educational 
opportunity waxed important in the final analysis of these two 
mergers. The concept of merger was afloat in the cities of Fall 
River, New Bedford and Lowell long before the fact of merger, but 
the idea attracted little support. In a period of state and 
national growth in public higher education, it was the 
consolidation and estpansion of educational purpose as a matter of 
public policy appears to be the compelling force behind the 
combinations. 
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CHAPTER 3 
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSEm'S AT BOSTCaj, 1982 
Introduction 
Just as environmental factors were inportant in the creation 
of the Southeastern Massachusetts University and the University of 
Lowell, matters of public policy, finance and geography were 
similarly important in the merger of Boston State College and the 
University of Massachusetts/Boston in 1982. Yet this one act of 
public policy, accomplished in a period of pxjblic tax cutting 
initiatives and a controversial reorganization of public higher 
education, engendered in those who participated in the resultant 
merger such a strong anger and sense of unfairness that it lingers 
today, eight years after the fact. Those who did not participate 
in the process of merger may find this feature somevrtiat 
surprising, for by most outward signs the merger was both logical 
and successful. Where once in the city of Boston there existed 
two public baccalaureate degree granting institutions, there is 
now a single, strong university. 
The merger of Boston State College and the University of 
Massachusetts/Boston is an example of an overt act of public 
policy and as such it is also a demonstration of the hegemony of 
the political process vrtiich produces that public policy. The 
contrast betvreen the relatively tranquil mergers at Southeastern 
Massachusetts University and the University of Lowell with that of 
the University of Massachusetts at Boston in 1982 provides the 
opportunity for additional insight into the phenomenon of mergers 
in pLiblic higher education. 
Boston State College 
Boston State College began as the Boston Normal School in 
1852. It was created by an act of the Boston City Council in 
July, 1852 to prepare young women to become teachers in the 
grammar schools in the city of Boston. The Boston Normal School 
was the second city supported normal school in the Itoited States, 
coming after a comparable normal school was established in 
Philadelphia in 1848. 
The normal school offered a one year course of study and 
included such subjects as spelling, reading, arithmetic, english, 
grammer, geography, history, drawing, vocal music, and 
composition. The curriculum also stressed the need for training 
in high moral character. There were eighty six young women 
enrolled in the first class at the school. 
In 1888 the normal school year was lengthened to one and one- 
half years and in 1892 expanded again to two years. By 1913 the 
length of training was extended once more, this time to three 
years. In 1922 another change took place in Boston as it did 
throughout the country when a fourth year was added to the 
curriculum. Another change occuorred in 1922 when the Great and 
General Court authorized the Boston Normal School the authority to 
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grant the Bachelor of Education degree to its graduates. Ihe 
Bostcxi Norroal School changed its name to the Teachers College of 
the city of Boston \dien it became a member of the higher education 
coraraunity. 
Statistics compiled in 1922 indicate that in the preceding 
fifty years there were 4,172 graduates of the Boston Normal 
School. In 1922, 1,970 of these graduates were working in the 
Bostcxi public schools. Boston Normal School was successful in 
meeting its missicxi of producing teachers for the public schools 
in the city of Bostai. 
As a city siflpported Teachers College, the institution 
continued its primary task of providing these teachers to the 
Boston public schools throu^ 1952. In 1948 the first men were 
admitted to the Teachers College. The instituticxi became a part 
of the state supported system of higher educaticai in 1952 and 
received funding through the state legislature, severing its 
formal ties to the city. 
Beginning in the 1950's the Boston State Teachers' College 
was subject to the same pressure for changes in curriculum as the 
other state colleges. Studies recoirroended the development of 
broader curricula and the constructicxi of additicaial j^ysical 
facilities for state teachers colleges throu^out the State. In 
1960 the institution was renamed Boston State College to reflect 
the continued diversification of academic programs of study. 
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During the 1960's Boston State developed a variety of new degree 
programs, mostly in the liberal arts, and in the 1970's began the 
developnent of programs in the professions. 
While Boston State College was changing its curriculum, the 
institution retained through the late 60's much of the operating 
style of normal school tradition. John Moon [1983] notes as 
follows: 
Under the administration of the college's seventh 
president. Dr. Willim F. Looney, 1948-1968, hiring 
was largely carried out by the president who showed 
a predilection for hiring graduates of Boston State 
College, Boston College, and Boston University. At 
that time, the College, described by its president 
as an extended family, was ruled with an iron grip 
by the Chief Executive vdio kept a faculty sign-in 
and sign-out sheet outside his office, who called 
male faculty members "boys" and female faculty 
members "girlies" and who insisted the faculty 
members should be present on campus from early 
morning to late afternoon, five days a week... 
Under Dr. Looney's administration, there was no 
faculty senate structure, no hiring committees, 
almost no department meetings, except at the 
beginning of each academic year, when the virgins 
were introduced to the tribe, [p.2] 
Changes in the administration of the College began after the 
resignation of Dr. Looney in 1968. The Willis-Harrington 
Reorganization Act of 1965 also mandated the creation of the 
faculty senates at the state colleges, and in the years 
immediately following Looney's tenure the faculty at Boston State 
College organized for collective bargaining and joined the 
American Federation of Teachers. 
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The early 1970's saw a notable diminishment in the demand for 
secondary school teachers and this had an immediate impact on 
enrollment levels at Boston State College. Similarly, there was a 
lessening of demand for the newly created arts and sciences 
programs that were created in the institutional transition to a 
liberal arts college. 
Rermit C. Morrissey was appointed president in 1971 and began 
the development of professional programs at the College in 
nursing, public service, urban studies and management. He hired 
new faculty, often part-time, to teach these programs. This 
approach continued through the 1970's and had the effect of 
developing large, permanent faculty departments out of proportion 
to the enrollment in academic programs. Programmatic change was 
not accompanied by a realignment of the Boston State faculty 
workforce, but was accomplished through an incremental process 
which brought many part-time faculty to the college. 
John Moon [1983] observes that through this period of change 
from normal school to state college to liberal arts college to 
professional college, there was also no esprit developed at the 
college of coiranitment to a common purpose similar to that which 
had existed at the normal school. In addition, a succession of 
presidents failed to gain the confidence of the faculty and were 
not able to define the identity nor defend the institution to the 
public or to the political structure. 
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Despite its long existence, therefore, the 
College had failed to develop a recognizable 
or respected presence through two decades of 
tumultuous change, faculty revolt, faculty 
quarrels, and student protests. Instead, 
still partly tarnished with a slur of "Huntington 
High," its reputation was further stained by 
the educational experiments of the 1960's and 
the 1970's. Its achievements, in becoming an 
urban college, and steadily upgrading its faculty, 
in providing low cost education and flexible 
hours to working class students, were ignored. 
[1983, p. 4] 
The thirty years prior to the 1982 merger were difficult for 
Boston State College. It had not made a strong transition to a 
liberal arts or professional college from a normal school, it 
suffered from a diminished reputation, and it compared poorly to 
the new and growing public university in the city. 
Ikiiversitv of Massachusetts at Boston 
The University of Massachusetts at Boston opened its doors to 
1,200 students in 1965 in a temporary campus in downtown Boston. 
Ibe University, created by an act of the legislature in 1964, had 
the mission of serving the people of eastern M^sachusetts, 
primarily the city of Boston, by providing a full range of 
educational opportunities in post secondary education common to 
those of other universities. The institution opened with a 
college of arts and sciences offering a standard curriculum. The 
original intent was to provide a high quality - a working man's 
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Harvard - education for its students. Faculty were recruited 
based on terminal degrees and there was an enphasis on research 
and publication. 
Organizationally, there was a plan to create six separate 
colleges of arts and sciences, and toward that end in 1971 faculty 
were divided into two separate colleges, designated I and II, with 
soroev^t different curricular patterns. It was hoped that 
eventually each of the six colleges would have an enrollment of 
approximately 2,000 students. The intent was to combine the 
advantages of a small student population with the advantages of a 
large university. Hiis evolution did not take place as planned 
and in 1976 colleges I and II were combined again into a college 
of arts and sciences. 
There was an effort to provide professional education at the 
University as well. Two professional colleges were created in the 
1970’s. The College of Public and Ccanmunity Service was started 
in 1973 to serve an older and diverse clientele by offering a 
competency based curriculum that combined preparation for public 
service Ccureers with the liberal arts education. In 1975 the 
College of Professional Studies was created to offer programs in 
the various fields of management. The name was eventually changed 
to the College of Management. Construction of a permanent new 
campus on Boston Harbor began in 1970 and was conpleted four years 
later. Most of the Ikiiversity's operation and academic programs 
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were transferred to the harbor campus, although the College of 
Public and Community Service remained in the original downtown 
Park Square facility. 
Graduate programs were likewise developed in the 1970's at 
the University. By 1982 the Ikiiversity offered the graduate 
progams at the doctoral level in environmental sciences and at the 
masters' level in American Civilization, Biology, Biotechnology, 
Bioiitedical Science, Business Administration, Chemistry, Conputer 
Science, Critical and Creative Thinking, English, History, Human 
Services, Instructional Design, Physics, Public Affairs, and 
Applied Sociology. Some caution prevailed in the developnent of 
graduate programs at the Boston canpus to avoid duplication of 
similar programs at the Amherst canpus of the University. 
The University of Massachusetts at Boston continued its 
development and expansion throijgh the 1970's, although it lost 
son® of the idealism inheroit in the notion of the six separate 
colleges of liberal arts. It was achieving growing recognition 
and organizationally it reflected the prevailing form of other 
universities throughout the country. It was lacking only an 
extensive offering of doctoral progams, but efforts were being 
made to develop these as well. 
The Itoiversity strove to place itself on its own standing as 
a university, although such efforts were always made in the shadow 
of the original state university in Amherst. The University of 
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Massachusetts at Boston made a concerted effort to provide public 
university education to an urban population, attenpting to 
preserve its university status commensurate with the Amherst 
institution, yet serving a distinct and special mission in the 
city of Boston. Table one provides a limited comparison of Boston 
State College and the University of Massachusetts at Boston in the 
fall of 1981. While this schedule demonstrates statistically that 
the university was larger and had a better prepared student body, 
there are several matters which mere numbers fail to reflect. 
Table 1 
Boston State and UMass Boston Descriptive Statistics. Fall 1981 
Description Boston State UMass Boston 
Enrollment: 
Full-time equivalent 4,174 
Headcount 4,695 
Median family income $13,400 
Average age 26 
Percent white 83% 
Percent minority 14.5% 
Percent black 13% 
6,800 
8,060 
$16,100 
25 
87.9% 
10.1% 
7.3% 
SAT Scores: 
Verbal 
Math 
Total 
360 434 
389 466 
749 900 
Personnel Levels: 
Faculty 
Professional 
Classified 
Total 
270 399 
36 139 
130 376 
436 914 
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^feraer 
The 1982 merger that combined Boston State College with the 
University of Massachusetts at Boston can best be understood in 
the context of the public system of higher education in the 
Commonwealth and the stresses on the system that en«rged 
subsequent to the Willis-Harrington Act of 1965. The Willis- 
Harrington Act provided for a system of five segmental boards of 
trustees for the lAiiversity of Massachusetts, Southeastern 
Massachusetts Iftiiversity, the University of Lowell, the ten state 
colleges and fifteen community colleges. 
In addition to the five segmental boards there was a central 
Board of Higher Education v^ich was responsible for the review of 
budgetary requests frcan the segmental boards and for the 
developanrtent of a master plan. However, this overall board had 
little real authority and never attained the staff necessary to 
adequately review budgets or establish master plans. Complicating 
the issue of the role of the Board of Higher Education was the 
creation of the position of Secretary of Education in a general 
reorganization of the Commonwealth's governance structure in 1972. 
As a result of the system of segmental boards and the 
conflicting responsibilities between the Board of Higher Education 
and the Secretary of Education, there was little overall 
coordination of public higher education in the Conmonwealth. The 
fiscal crisis of the mid—1970's called this system into question. 
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Each of the segmental boards had fiscal autonomy and a relatively 
narrow mission. The result was a wide variety of academic 
programs but also an apparent duplication of effort in these 
programs. Indeed, any condition of cooperation between the 
segnoits required the approval of both segmental boards of 
trustees, each of which was concerned with the inportance of its 
own mission and hence guarded its own prerogatives with care. 
Hiere were several early trial balloons proposing a 
reorganization of public higher education, but it was Senate 
President Kevin Harrington who finally convened a special 
commission on the reorganization of higher education. This 
special commission was chaired by Senator Walter Boverini and 
consisted of five senators, ten representatives and ten 
gubernatorial appointees. This Special Commission, often referred 
to as the Boverini Commission, accomplished little subsequent to 
its formation in 1977 until the election of Edward J. King who had 
defeated the incumbent Michael Dukakis as Governor of the 
Commonwealth. Governor King's ajpointees were sworn in on 
October, 1979 and the Commission began its task in earnest. It is 
not unimportant that one of the platform issues espoused by Edward 
King in his campaign for governor was the application of the 
business values of efficiency and effectiveness in state 
government. 
58 
The Special Ccaranission organized its work into two sub- 
crarnndttees to concentrate on separate issues. One subcommittee 
considered the overall governance of public higher education in 
the Commonwealth, vrtiile the other subcommittee focused on the 
reorganization of public higher education in the Boston area. 
The Commission appeared to favor the establishment of a 
strong central governing board and to reorganize public higher 
education in the city of Boston but could not achieve a consensus. 
The activity of the Boverini Commission remained stalemated, 
perhaps in part because of Representative James Collins of 
Amherst. Representative Collins "_who chaired the House 
Education Committee, remained vehemently opposed to the idea of a 
central board. He saw it as a major threat to the auton<xny of 
UMass Amherst” [Hogarty, p. 15]. Similarly, no consensus could be 
achieved on the structure of public higher education in the city 
of Boston ^hich included in addition to the University of 
Massachusetts at Boston and Boston State College, Bunker Hill and 
RorfDury Community Colleges and the Massachusetts College of Art. 
The story may be apocryphal, but it is rumored that the three 
leaders of Irish descent in the Commonwealth, Governor Edward 
King, Sp)eaker of the House Thcxnas McGee, and the newly elected 
Senate President William Bulger, agreed on a plane to Ireland 
(pserhaps Amsterdam) that the reorganization of higher education 
would be accomplished in an outside section of the budget for 
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fiscal year 1981. In April of 1980, Representative John Finnegan, 
Chair of the House Committee on Ways and ^teans, released House 
Bill 6200, the House budget for fiscal year 1981. The outside 
section of this budget proposed the creation of a fifteen member 
Board of Regents to replace the segmental boards. 
Hiis outside section permitted the boards of trustees of the 
three state universities to remain intact, leaving the proposed 
Board of Regents to administer the state and community college 
systems, lliere was a general public reaction against using the 
budget process to accomplish a reorganization of public higher 
education, though this alarm never reached sufficient proportions 
to halt this particular legislation in the House of 
Representatives. The Massachusetts Teachers Association, a union 
representing most faculty members in the Caonmonwealth system of 
public higher education, was a major opponent of this approach to 
reorganization and attacked the plan. 
One result of House Bill 6200 was to stimulate a consensus on 
the Boverini Coiranission. The focus of Ccxnmission activity, just 
as with the Finnegan legislation, was the reorganization of the 
system of governance of public higher education. James Collins 
conceived a plan in May of 1980 that would create a twenty-one 
member board of governors with the power to prepare a budget by 
segment and institution, and vdiich could terminate programs or 
degrees, and transfer an institution from one segment of public 
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higher education to another by a two-thirds vote of the Board of 
Governors. A minority report by two members of the special 
commission. Dr. George Hazzard and John F. Collins, a former 
president of Worcester Polytechnic Institute and a former mayor of 
Boston, respectively, was proposed. George Hazzard and John 
Collins called for the dissolution of the segmental and university 
boards of trustees and the creation of a fifteen member Board of 
Regents with the power to approve and terminate programs and 
institutions, and with e3q>anded budgetary responsibilities. 
The Senate budget bill did not include the outside language 
proposed by Representative Finnegan. The matter then became the 
subject of a conference committee made necessary to resolve the 
differences between the House and the Senate appropriation bills. 
The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Ways and Ifeans, Chester 
Atkins, had been an opponent of the reorganization of public 
higher education, particularly though an outside section of the 
budget. However, on June 5, 1980 Senator Atkins had a change of 
heart and both he and Representative Finnegan supported the 
minority proposal of George Hazzard and John Collins. 
The amendment of Chapter 15A of the Massachusetts General 
Laws was accepted by the Conference Committee and included the 
major recommendations of the Hazzard-Collins plan. It created a 
fifteen member Board of Regents with program and budgetary 
responsibilities, and, with a two-thirds vote of the full 
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membership of the Board, the power to consolidate, discontinue, or 
transfer divisions, schools, stations, colleges, branches or 
institutions as it deemed advisable. 
The attachment of the bill to reorganize public higher 
education in the Commonwealth to a budget bill emerging from a 
conference coiranittee had a significant practical legislative 
advantage for its proponents. During debate in the two chambers, 
the bill could not be amended. Individuals would have to oppose 
the budget in total in order to stop the legislation to reorganize 
public higher education. The Senate and House passed the budget 
on June 10, 1980 and it was signed into law the same day by 
Governor King. 
The Higher Education Reorganization Act of 1980, the 
attachment to the appropriation bill, abolished the segn^ntal 
boards of trustees at the community and state colleges as well as 
the position of the Secretary of Education and the Board of Higher 
Education. Each institution was provided with a local board of 
trustees and, along with the university boards of trustees, were 
placed under the overall authority of the Board of Regents vdiich 
had both coordinating and governing functions. The legislation 
provided that reorganization would take effect in March of 1981. 
In the debate and discussion of the overall governance of 
public higher education in the Ctarnmonwealth, the issue of public 
higher education in the city of Boston was tenporarily deferred. 
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However, the delegation of the authority to the Board of Regents 
to terminate colleges and institutions did not go unnoticed. 
Governor King began to make his appointments to the newly 
formed Board of Regents of Higher Education shortly after the 
enactment of the legislation. The Governor's appointments to the 
new Board of Regents were primarily individuals from the business 
world. The Board Chairman of the Massachusetts Mutual Life 
Insurance Company, James R. Martin, was appointed as the Regent's 
first Chair. The newly formed Board of Regents began intermittent 
meetings during late 1980 prior to the assumption of its statutory 
responsibilities in March of 1981. In addition to the formidable 
task of selecting of new Chancellor of the Board of Regents, a 
major issue before the Board was the publicly unresolved issue of 
public higher education in the city of Boston. 
The Governor completed appointments to the newly formed Board 
of Regents by late 1980. The first substantive policy issue to be 
taken up by the Board of Regents was the organization of public 
higher education in the Boston area. The Regents created a task 
force for the purpose, chaired by George Hazzard, now a member of 
the Board of Regents. The task force conpleted its work just as 
the Regents assumed its statutory responsibility in March of 1981, 
calling for the discontined governance of Boston State College. 
The Board of Regents appointed John Duff, President of the 
tkiiversity of Lowell, as its first Chancellor in March of 1981. 
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Chancellor Duff was a coitpromise appointment when the Board of 
Regents could not select from three prominent contenders, David 
Bartley (former Speaker of the House and sitting President of 
Holyoke Community College), Kermit Morrissey (a prominent state 
official and former President of Boston State College), and 
Franklin Patterson (founding President of Hampshire College and 
interim President of the University of Massachusetts). The 
original task force plan presented at a public hearing of April 
10, 1981 was soundly attacked by Boston State College faculty 
representatives, particularly John Moon, a union leader; 
After examining the procedural irregularities 
and the conceptual weakness of the report, I 
concentrated my attack on its governing assumption: 
"This report is most fundamentally flawed by its 
underlying, mechanistic view. The reigning image 
is the comparison of higher education to a 
reorganized factory. Faculty, students, staff 
were treated as movable parts which are to 
directed and re-directed according to some 
anonymous, invisible will." [1983, p. 14] 
Chancellor Duff reviewed the task force plan and recommended 
instead a new process for the consolidation of Boston State 
College and the University of Massachusetts at Boston. He offered 
a plan similar to the implementation process used in the creation 
of the Ikiiversity of Lowell. Dr. Duff recommended establishing an 
Implementation Board composed of Trustees from both Boston State 
College and Ubfoss Boston as well as principal others. There was 
opposition to this plan from the University of Massachusetts Board 
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Chair, Robert Quinn, because of concern over the coitposition of 
the Implementation Board, v^ch apparently would mitigate the 
influence of the University. Boston State faculty opposed the 
plan because it did not include a clear mandate to merge as equal 
institutions. The plan as presented by John Duff was the subject 
of debate through June and July of 1982. 
While the Board of Regents and its Chancellor were 
considering a reasonable combination over a three-year period, the 
legislature acted in a way v^ch precluded a lengthy process 
leading to merger. The voters of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts had enacted a revenue restraining referendum. 
Proposition 2 1/2, vrtiich capped local taxing authority. In the 
face of this drastic limitation on local revenue-raising capacity, 
the Committees on Ways and Means in the House and Senate proposed 
a substantial increase in funds for local aid for fiscal 1982. In 
the debate over the level of local aid the suggestion was made 
that the Commonwealth could not also afford quality public higher 
education as existed in other states. 
The Senate appropriation bill for fiscal 1982 was, for public 
higher education, compiled differently than in prior years. It 
grouped community colleges and universities into clusters and 
provided for a specific amount of money for the operation of the 
clustered entity. While this Senate plan originally covered all 
colleges and unversities in the Commonwealth, political pressure 
65 
on Senators from local constituencies finally narrowed the concept 
of clustering of public higher education frcan the entire 
Commonwealth to the Boston area. One cluster was the combination 
of Framin^am State College and Mass Bay Community College in 
Boston's western suburbs. Another cluster occurred in the city of 
Boston with the combination of the University of Massachusetts at 
Boston, Boston State College, Roxbury and Bunker Hill Community 
Colleges and the Mass College of Art. The funding for the Boston 
cluster was notably short. In the face of a cumulative 
underfunding of roughly six million dollars, a plan was set in 
motion to accelerate the process of merger from three years to 
less than one month. In Augiist Chancellor Duff and the Board of 
Regents decided to fully fund Roxbury and Bunker Hill Community 
Colleges, the Ikiiversity of Massachusetts at Boston and the Mass 
College of Art, and to discontinue Boston State College 
immediately. The Board of Regents approved this plan on 
August 21, 1981. 
Ihe plan accepted by the Board of Regents on August 21, 1981 
included the following provisions; 
1. Those Boston State College faculty with an appropriate 
terminal degree will be offered an appointment at UM^s 
Boston at the same rank, salary and tenure status held 
Boston State College. The remaining faculty will be 
terminated effective August 29, 1981. 
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2. Those Boston State College faculty terminated will 
receive thirty days notice and all contractual 
severance rights. 
3. Two hundred and seventy-five part-time faculty at 
UMass Boston and Boston State will be terminated 
immediately. 
The faculty union took the matter to Suffolk Superior Court 
and obtained a retraining order blocking the termination of any 
faculty members at Boston State College. On August 31, the Board 
of Regents agreed to operate Boston State College for the fall, 
1981 semester. 
The faculty union contract in existence at Boston State 
College called for the lay-off of faculty and other unit members 
v^ien a state of financial exigency exists. On September 8, 1981 
the Board of Regents declared that such a situation existed and 
the impact of the six million dollar budget underfimding was fully 
placed on Boston State College. The Board of Regents met on 
October 30, 1981 to implement a plan for the final disposition of 
faculty and staff at Boston State College. At the n^eting a 
motion was proposed to terminate most of the employees at Boston 
State College. "In a crowd-packed room, the Regents voted to 
suspend the motion. The Regents were assured, by the legislative 
leadership in the last twenty tour hours before the meeting, that 
a deficiency budget would be filed" [Jfoon, 1983, p. 19]. 
67 
Chancellor John Duff was asked to provide the educational 
reasons behind the merger to the legislature's Joint Committee on 
Education on November 23, 1981. A primary focus of his attention 
was program duplication. He noted that 80% of all majors at 
Boston State were duplicated at UMass Boston. He also cited some 
telling statistics indicating student/faculty ratios at Boston 
State: 
At Boston State College, the History faculty numbers 
30 full-time professors; there are 73 majors in History. 
Ihe English faculty numbers 42 fiill-time faculty; 
there are 106 majors in English. The Physics faculty 
numbers 7 full-time professors; there are 8 majors in 
Physics. The Chemistry faculty numbers 8 full-time 
professors; there are 14 majors in Chemistry. The 
Philosc^y faculty numbers 9 fiill-tiroe professors; 
there are 12 majors in Philosphy. 
On the other hand, the Management program has 1002 majors 
and 4 full-time faculty. Now, if that is not an unwise 
use of faculty resources, then I do not know vrtiat is an 
unwise use of faculty resources. [Duff, November 23, 1981] 
It was not until January 5, 1982 that the legislature passed 
and the Governor signed Chapter 808 of the Acts of 1981, a 
si^plemental budget appropriation. Chapter 808 directed the Board 
of Regents to discontinue Boston State College as of January 24, 
1982. The bill also provided an authorization for the Regents to 
continue displaced Boston State faculty on the Regents payroll 
until they could find other employment in the system of public 
hi^er education or until June 30, 1982, v^iichever came first. 
The June 30th deadline was later extended until.August 31, 1982. 
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The bill also provided that tenured faculty members would continue 
to retain the privilege and that, where appropriate, six years of 
seniority would apply to Boston State faculty members enployed in 
the public higher education system other than another state 
college. 
The long process of merger that started with the 
consideration of reorganization of all of public higher education 
in the Commonwealth came to a conclusion on January 24, 1982. The 
impact of the merger was felt for years after the actual fact of 
the combination. The University of Massachusetts at Boston 
appeared to pick and choose from among Boston State faculty it 
deemed worthy of teaching at the university. Other state college 
faculty were reluctant to accept into their faculty ranks Boston 
State College personnel senior to them. There was also concern 
that since these individuals could be placed in low enrollment 
departments at other state colleges, they would in fact displace 
resident faculty members in time. Many former Boston State 
College faculty members found employment at the University of 
Lowell and in the community college system. 
Most of the individuals frcan Boston State College were placed 
by September 30, 1982. More than twenty faculty members chose 
early retirement rather than alternative placement. Yet the legal 
problems continued throu^ 1989 as a result of personnel placement 
in the merger of the two institutions. 
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The above represents a chronological outline of the events 
leading up to the merger of Boston State College and UMass Boston. 
Yet such a chronological perspective merely sets the framework for 
an understanding of the issues which precipitated merger and which 
influenced the process by \diich the merger was carried out. One 
thing is certain regarding this merger: The power of public 
policy prevailed. Whether the agreement of the State’s leaders 
occurred on a plane ride to Ireland or to Amsterdam or in the 
halls of the State House, the obvious fact remains that there was 
an agreement, and this agreement resulted in the reorganization of 
public higher education and in the merger of Boston State College 
and UMass/Boston. 
A common question was posed to prominent individuals, 
participants in the public arena at the time of the merger: "Why 
was the first policy act of a newly created Board of Regents, 
consisting of fifteen individuals frcan disparate backgrounds, and 
with no governance esqjerience in public higher education, the 
merger of a 130-year old state college into a 17-year old 
university?" 
Former Governor Foster Furcolo, an original member of the 
Board of Regents, indicated that the question of merger did not 
appear to be whether it should be done, but how it would be 
accomplished. Governor Furcolo observed that his major concern in 
the matter was that the combination be a merger of equals, and not 
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a situation in vdiich UMass would dictate the terms of the merger. 
Regent Furcolo was one of two Regents to vote against the August 
merger plan to dissolve Boston State for the fall semester of 1981 
[personal communication, January 25, 1989]. 
Robert Quinn, former Speaker of the House of Representatives 
and Chairman of the UMass Boston Board of Trustees, felt the 
merger appeared inevitable especially after the reorganization of 
public higher education in the Ccanmonwealth. Speaker Quinn wanted 
the University to continue its development and advancement as a 
prominent public university in the city of Boston. It was not a 
decision of UMass Boston to merge the two institutions; however, 
the Iftiiversity took the issue of merger seriously and attempted to 
make those decisions that would strengthen the University over 
time. It appeared that those lobbying for Boston State College 
were trying to obfuscate the educational issues involved which the 
Ikiiversity considered primary. The budget for fiscal 1982, 
especially the cluster budget, forced the issue of it^rger 
[personal communication, Febuary 7, 1989]. 
Representative (now Senator) Michael Creedon, Chairman of the 
House Committee on Ways and Means in March of 1981, felt the 
fiscal 1982 budget was the precipitating action which brought 
about the merger of the two institutions. The budget crisis was a 
direct result of Proposition 2 1/2 and the State's effort to 
provide a substantial increase in local aid to cities and towns. 
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Representative Creedon suggested there existed a general 
understanding that UMass Boston was the appropriate provider of 
urban public baccalaureate education, primarily as a result of the 
leadership of Robert Quinn. He felt it was redundant to have both 
Boston State College and UMass Boston. Boston State College had a 
number of serious problems including a bad location, poor 
facilities and hodgepodge of faculty members. The Board of 
Regents did not make the merger its first act, the real decision 
was made by the legislature and underfunding the Boston cluster 
was the vehicle to accomplish it [personal communication, 
January 31, 1989]. 
Roger Schiness, Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs at the 
Board of Regents at the time, suggested that it was the 
legislative intent to merge the two institutions. He noted that 
it was a public policy decision to discontinue Boston State 
College, and the job of accomplishing of it was left to the Board 
of Regents. He felt by August of 1981 the Board of Regents and 
John Duff were faced with the reality of discontinuance, and no 
longer could sustain the possibility of a merger of equals. The 
issue then became vAiat to do with faculty members at Boston State 
College and how to least disrupt students [personal communication, 
January 26, 1989]. 
Kevin Harrington, former Senate President, felt the academic 
decline of Boston State College in the late 60's and 70's and its 
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corntnunity college-like open enrollment policy made the long term 
existence of Boston State College untenable. The institution’s 
reputation declined to such an extent that it was not a conpetent 
conpetitor in the race to offer public baccalaureate education in 
the city of Boston. He suggests that Governor King apparently 
reached an agreement with House Speaker McGee and Senate President 
Bulger and that this agreement ultimately resulted in the 
legislation that brought about merger [personal communication, 
February 3, 1989]. 
Franklin Patterson, at the time of merger a professor at the 
University of Massachusetts at Boston, but formerly interim 
President of the University of Massachusetts, felt the merger 
arose as a result of an agreement among the leadership in the 
legislature of House Speaker McGee and Senate President Bulger and 
the willingness of the Governor to go along with both 
reorganization and the merger of the two institutions. Dr. 
Patterson opined that although the Ikiiversity of Massachusetts at 
Boston had no interest in the merger, once it was perceived as 
inevitable, the strategy then became how to help UMass Boston come 
out of the situation stronger and to avoid those compromises that 
would diminish its stature. Since this merger would in fact be 
acccsiplished, there was a sense of a primary responsibility to see 
that the University improve itself [personal ccmtmunication, 
March 15, 1988]. 
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John Weston, former Boston State College professor and now a 
staff member at the Board of Regents, considered the unresolved 
issues fr<Mn the Boverini Commission deliberations in the late 
1970's as the primary cause of the merger. At those hearings 
every reeison proposed in favor of the merger was always countered 
with an equally valid reason for opposing the merger. He said 
that although the University of M^sachiisetts at Boston did not 
appear to want a merger, once it appeared that such an action 
would be inevitable, the University wanted to be on top. The 
public policy issue of the role of public higher education in 
Boston was never adequately addressed either by the Boverini 
Commission or subsequently by the Board of Regents. UMass Boston 
was apparently created to serve the inner city and the 
disadvantaged, but this, too, was the same mission as Boston State 
College. UMass chose an elitist "Harvard-on-the-Harbor” approach. 
John Weston also points to the role of Kermit Morrissey in 
the merger process. Kermit Morrissey was appointed President of 
Boston State College in the early 1970's, yet had lost the 
confidence of its faculty by 1980. Kermit Morrissey, v^ile 
President of Boston State College, supported the elimination of 
BSC and its merger with UMass Boston. Although he had political 
clout and a long standing relationship with the political 
leadership in the Commonwealth, his recommendation of merger was 
not supported by Boston State faculty [personal communication, 
February 22, 1988]. 
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Dr. Houston Elam, then Dean of Business at UMass Boston, 
suggests that the real reason for the merger is related to the 
development of pxjblic policy. Governor King had canpaigned on a 
platform of efficiency in government and reducing duplication in 
higher education. 'This campaign promise required some validation 
and he was able to secure agreement with the legislative 
leadership to acconplish reorganization and merger. He could 
accomplish both objectives through the creation of the Board of 
Regents and by reducing the number of institutions in the State by 
consolidating Boston State and UMass Boston. Dr. Elam felt that 
UMass Boston had very little choice in how to approach the matter 
of merger. There was an excess capacity in public baccalaureate 
education in Boston and in self-defense the Iftiiversity had to take 
those steps vdiich would support and oichance the University's 
standing. If there had been a merger of all faculty, it would not 
have resulted in a faculty with the status expected at a 
university. Had there been a combination of equals it would not 
have been a university but a "collaversity", something between a 
state college and a university. In the face of a situation v^ch 
it did not create, the University chose to do that vdiich woiild 
most enhance its standing [personal cararainication, June 5, 1989]. 
John Moon has written extensively on the issues of this 
merger. He was Professor of History at Boston State College, 
President of its Faculty Association, and led the fight to halt 
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the reorganization that resulted in the merger of Boston State 
College and UMass Boston. 
The question that confronted the Regents vdien 
they assumed authority on March 1, 1981, was 
the question of public higher education in the 
Metropolitan Boston area. For a number of 
years a conviction had grown among the 
legislative leadership, a conviction shared 
hy the Governor, that there were too many 
institutions of public higher education in 
the Boston area. Long before March 1, 1981, 
this conviction had hardened to dogma. 
[1982, p. 57] 
John Moon writes with a highly charged and emotional pen of a 
prevailing analysis of the merger: 
Many Boston State College students and faculty 
are convinced that the destruction of BSC was 
the culmination of a sinister, well coordinated 
conspiracy between leaders in state government, 
the high technology lobby, the private colleges 
and universities and the University of 
Massachusetts. A few men of power had decided 
that Boston State College must be eliminated. 
[1982, p. 60] 
Moon suggests that rather than a Manichean duel, one must 
understand that educational policy makers had several alternatives 
open to them, including maintenance of the status quo, 
discontinuance of UMass Boston and merging it into Boston State 
College, or consolidate UMass and Boston State College as equals, 
in addition to the actual historical result of January, 1982. He 
suggests the status quo was never feasible because of the 
prevailing political assunption that son^thing had to be done in 
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the face of Proposition 2 1/2. He notes that the prospect of the 
discontinuance of UMass Boston was never seriously considered 
because the University was perceived as the stronger acadendc 
institution. Finally, the merger of the two institutions as 
equals was not appealing either to the legislature or the 
Governor. "It was too slow, too deliberate, too dependent upon 
elaborate committee reports, and less consultation and sensitive 
compromise" [1982, p. 62]. 
UMB administration took a position which 
was clear and ruthlessly consistent. If 
the merger took place, it should be dictated 
and governed by the University. UMB would 
take whatever programs and personnel it 
wanted and needed. Unfortimately for the 
Boston State faculty, the overwheming 
majority of UMB faculty supported the 
administration policy of academic 
annexation. [1982, p. 63] 
Moon concludes with notable emotion and resignation; 
So the issue was resolved on a Darwinian 
battlefield. In the absence of leadership 
from those whose responsibility it is to 
act impartially vdien dealing with competing 
interests, the University of Massachusetts 
at Boston reorganized higher education in 
the metropolitan area. Reorganization 
took place as it did because this course 
of action was seen as the easiest solution 
to an accepted problem. [1982, p. 64] 
John Duff, Chancellor of the Board of Regents at the time 
charged with implementing the merger, suggests the merger came 
about through legislative pressure. Such a merger had long been 
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talked about and appeared inevitable. There was common knowledge 
of declining enrollment at Boston State College and of the 
resultant effort to admit on an open basis. This approach to 
enrollment was especially notable in contrast to UMass Boston. 
Boston State College was perceived as superfluous in a city with a 
university offering pijblic baccalaureate education. It also had 
the reputation of being a dunping ground for problem enployees and 
as a place vrtiere friends of politicians could get jobs. Finally, 
Boston State College had few defenders of stature except for its 
faculty and a few of the faculty friends in the legislature. In 
contrast, the newly elected Governor was strong and supported 
consolidation. 
The cluster budget for fiscal 1982 was the vehicle by which 
the Boston State College closure was forced. Chancellor Duff 
makes the point that in spite of the personal upheaveal created by 
the process of merger, the creation of a single baccalaureate 
degree granting university in the city of Boston has ultimately 
proven to be a successful venture [personal communication, June 5, 
1989]. 
Summary 
There is a clear pattern that emerges from a review of the 
chronological sequence of events and the comments of the principal 
participants in the merger that combined Boston State College and 
UMass Boston. The combination was an overt act of public policy 
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even though the process it took may have hidden the intentions 
that lay behind that policy development. It may well have been 
the canpaign promises of Governor Edward King and the agreement of 
Speaker McGee and President Bulger vdiich brought about this 
policy. While this instance of public policy was not drawn in the 
articulate fashion of Foster Furcolo in this desire to combine the 
textile schools and create Southeastern Massachusetts University, 
it can still be said that this policy was based on a reasonable 
assessment of the situation of pijblic baccalaureate education in 
the city of Bostcxi. 
The reorganization commission appeared to be an appropriate 
political approach to achieve this policy but it failed to achieve 
a consensus. Boston State College faculty members had numerous 
personal contacts with individual legislators and the effect of 
this negative vote helped the cause of delaying an agreement on 
the issue of merger. This negative vote was ironically 
complemented by the actions of the University of Massachusetts and 
the Amherst representative, James Collins, \dio opposed the 
creation of a strong coitral authority over all of public higher 
education and, hence, worked against a consensus in the committee. 
Ihis seems to be an instance of a successful public policy, 
viewed frcmi the detached perspective of the analyst eight years 
after the fact. This judgn^nt can be made with a simple 
observation that the University of Massachusetts does indeed 
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provide a quality baccalaureate education in the city of Boston, 
There is no redundancy in the public mission in the city v^ch has 
a university and community colleges, save, however, the status of 
the Mass College of Art. The latter represents a specialized 
baccalaureate education in the city which is tenable as a separate 
institution only as long as that specialized education can remain 
distinct frcan that of the xmiversity. 
If one can say that the merger policy was successful because 
subsequent events have proven its merit, one must also be prepared 
to say that its major failure is the manner of its implementation. 
The poor treatment of the individuals involved and the failure to 
co-opt the two institutional participants in the process resulted 
in a merger that deeply effected the lives of many people. 
Many faculty members at Boston State College sinply could not 
believe that the institution would close. Ihis view sustained 
them in their effort to view the alternative to merger as the 
status quo. This belief worked in direct contravention of the 
consensus of the political leadership in the Commonwealth vtfiich 
was determined to close Boston State and n«rge it with the 
University of Massachusetts at Boston. 
Chancellor John Duff, handed the difficult situation of 
implementing the merger, was successful in maintaining the 
enployment status of virtually every Boston State College 
employee. But anger persists to this day over the compromises 
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this process produced in the lives of the individuals involved, 
primarily because of their sense of powerlessness to influence the 
situation. Many careers were fundamentally altered in the process 
of merger. 
There is an ironic perspective one can take on the placement 
of Boston State College eitployees. In the situation where the 
University would pick and choose those it felt were appropriate 
for its purposes, and where other state colleges were reluctant to 
take individuals with many years of seniority, the placement 
process almost had to be in some respect unsatisfactory to the 
individuals involved. It may have been better to sinply terminate 
the employment of all individuals immediately upon the dissolution 
of Boston State College. Those individuals formerly employed at 
Boston State College are now spread throughout the system and 
carry their anger over their treatment with them to this day. 
Yet, too, the lingering memory of the UMass Boston merger had a 
definite and positive inpact on subsequent events in public higher 
education in the Commonwealth, roost specifically on the merger of 
Massasoit Comraunity College with the Blue Hills Technical 
Institute in 1985. 
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CHAPTER 4 
MASSASOIT COMMUNTrY COLLE3GE, 1985 
Introduction 
•nie August 1, 1985 merger of Massasoit Community College with 
the Blue Hills Technical Institute was finally acconplished with 
the enactment of the fiscal 1986 budget act ^diich included the 
legislative authorization for the merger. This merger, just as 
the three earlier public sector mergers before it, represented an 
instance of public policy activity because of this legislative 
connection. Yet ^^le this merger was similar to the three 
earlier combinations regarding legislative action, there was also 
a difference in the process by which the legislation was created. 
The mergers that brought about Southeastern Massachusetts 
lAiiversity, the lAiiversity of Lowell, and the Itoiversity of 
Massachusetts at Boston, were the result of initiatives by either 
the aoecutive or the legislature or both. Ihe legislation that 
resulted in the creation of a new Massasoit Community College in 
1985 was the culmination of actions initiated at the local level 
and ^rtiich resulted in approval by the legislature and the 
executive vdio held final responsibility. 
It is this variation ^ich, in the instance of Massasoit 
Caonraunity College, requires an adjustment in the primary focus of 
analysis, to include not only the perspective from the system of 
public higher education but the view from the institutional level 
as well. That is, there were certain local institutional and 
environmental characteristics v^ch began the process that 
culminated in the merger of the two institutions. It was, then, 
the responsibility of those institutions proposing a merger, and 
consequently suggesting a change in public policy, to indicate 
that this merger made sense not only institutionally but in terms 
of the system of public higher education in the Commonwealth. 
•nie immediate precipitating factor in the merger of M^sasoit 
and Blue Hills was the enactment of the Proposition 2 1/2 
referendum, just as it was in the UMass Boston situation. In the 
instance of UMass Boston this Proposition led to merger because of 
the agreement of executive and legislative leadership to limit 
state spending in order to provide additional funding for local 
cities and towns. 
Proposition 2 1/2 also had a notable impact on cities and 
towns in the Commonwealth and ultimately brought the Blue Hills 
Technical Institute to the point of merger. Since the tax capping 
referendum required a limitation on local expenditures, the seven 
member town school district eliminated local tax support for the 
post-secondary activities of the regional school district. Since 
the Technical Institute could not maintain an adequate level of 
performance without this local subsidy. Proposition 2 1/2 was also 
a precipitating factor in the Massasoit - Blue Hills merger even 
though it came three yeaurs after the UMass Boston merger. 
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•Hiere was very little contact between Massasoit Community 
College and the Blue Hills Technical Institute in the twenty years 
before the merger, in spite of some parallels in the development 
of these two institutions. While both institutions awarded the 
associates degree, the focus of each institution was distinct. 
Massasoit Oamraunity College pursued a comprehensive mission to 
provide transfer and career training for its graduates vrtiile the 
Blue Hills Technical Institute sought a more narrow and 
specicdized vocational training for its degree recipients. 
Massasoit Communitv College 
State supported regional community colleges in M^sachusetts 
were created with the passage of Chapter 605 of the Acts of 1958, 
the enabling legislation for the system of community colleges. A 
central governing body, the Board of Regional Community Colleges, 
was established to oversee the system and to determine the need 
for community colleges throu^out the various regions of the 
Commonwealth. Community college services were expected to be 
within reach of 95% of the population. Subsequent legislation 
enacted in 1964 granted the Board of Regional Community Colleges 
the same operational, autoncanous status as the four year segments 
of public hi^er education, the universities and the state 
colleges. 
The Willis-Harrington Act of 1965 substantially reorganized 
and restructured the educational system in Massachusetts, "nie 
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community colleges remained a distinct and autonomous segment 
within a system of public higher education, governed by the 
Massachusetts Board of Regional Community Colleges (MBRCC). A 
segmental board was also created for the eleven state colleges, 
and separate boards of trustees were created for the universities. 
As one element of a system of regional community colleges, 
Massasoit Community College opened in 1966 to serve the area south 
of Boston. It was the eleventh college in a system that would 
number fifteen institutions by 1973. The College was housed in 
several temporary facilities in various towns for six years before 
moving to its newly constructed and permanent home in Brockton in 
1972. By 1978 the final construction of its ten building, one 
hundred acre campus was completed. The College was accredited by 
the New England Association of Schools and Colleges in 1970. 
Governance of public higher education in Massachiisetts again 
changed with the passage of the outside section of the fiscal 1981 
appropriation act. The segmental governing boards, including the 
Board of Regional Community Colleges, were replaced by an overall 
coordinating body, the Board of Regents of Higher Education. At 
the institutional level community colleges were delegated 
substantial local control over operations, with said 
responsibility assigned to the newly created institutional Board 
of Trustees. The Governor appoints ten of the eleven numbers of 
the local board for a five year period, renewable for one 
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consecutive term. The eleventh tnastee is elected annually by the 
student body. 
When Massasoit opened in 1966, there were 358 students 
enrolled. The College esq^erienced continued growth in enrollment 
so that by the academic year 1984-85 there were 6,213 headcount 
students at the institution. Students were enrolled in curricula 
designed to meet the comprehensive college mission of providing 
liberal arts transfer and terminal occupational degree programs. 
The Liberal Arts degree programs were created primarily for 
those students intending to transfer to four year colleges and 
ijniversifies. The courses in this program were structured to 
parallel the first two years of a four year baccalaureate degree 
program. The occupational programs at the College were in non¬ 
capital equipment intensive programs such as secretarial, 
accounting, and merchandising because of limitations of space, 
facilities, equipment, and staff. There was also an academic 
reason to emphasize the less technical occupational programs. 
This approach was also based on the assumption that the education 
and training required for technical and specialized jobs would 
change rapidly, and that as a result the College should attenpt to 
I 
provide students with a broad based (i.e., liberal arts) education 
vdiich can be applied to changing skill demands. 
In 1984, Massasoit awarded the Associate in Arts (AA) or 
Associate in Science (AS) degrees in fourteen programs and 
Certificates in three one-year programs. 
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Table 2 
Massasoit Communitv Colleae Academic Proorams 
Prooram Credits 
Transfer 
Business Administration 60 
Liberal Arts 60 
Career 
Busimess Administration 60 
Data Processing 60 
Electronic Engineering 65 
Electro-Mechanical Engineering 65 
Executive Secretarial 68 
Solar Enegery Technology 61 
Fire Science Technology 60 
Law Enforcement 60 
Dental Lab Technology 65 
Human Services 62 
Nurse Education 64 
Respiratory Therapy 68 
Certificate 
Clerical Office Assistant 30 
Drafting 30 
Medical Transcriptionist 33 
At the time the merger was being negotiated, M^sasoit was 
considered a large, coirprehensive community college. It was 
governed hy a local Board of Trustees under the general oversight 
of the Board of Regents of Higher Education. Operational and 
capital funds were derived primarily from appropriations by the 
state legislature. It was one of fifteen community colleges in a 
system of public higher education v^ch also included ten state 
colleges and three universities. 
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Blue Hills Technical Institute 
A major event in the developnent of career education in the 
IMited States was the enactment of the Vocational Act of 1963 
(P.L. 88-210) vdiich emphasized and provided funding for the 
development of vocational education throughout the country. At 
the same time the existing Chapter 71 Section 16 of the General 
Laws of Massachusetts provided for the establishment of regional 
vocational school districts. Representatives frcan the seven towns 
of Avon, Braintree, Canton, Holbrook, Norwood, Randolph, and 
Westwood, Massachusetts planned the creation of a public career 
education center in the Bl\ie Hills region south of Boston. On 
December 17, 1963, all seven towns agreed to the creation of the 
Blue Hills Regional Vocational School District. 
Governance of the new entity was to be through a district 
school committee, a public body with all powers and duties 
conferred by law. Members of the district committee were elected 
by popular vote, one from each of the member towns on a rotating 
basis for three year terms. Programmatically, the school 
committee was then authorized to establish and maintain vocational 
education programs at the secondary, postsecondary, and adult 
levels as provided in of Chapter 74 of the Massachusetts General 
Laws. 
Following agreement of the towns in 1963 to create the school 
district and elect members of the regional committee, there was a 
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period of planning and construction. Two schools were developed 
during the planning period of 1964-66, one a vocational technical 
high school for grades nine to twelve and the other a post¬ 
secondary technical institute. Both schools would operate in the 
same building but would use different classrooms, labs, and 
faculty. In the fall of 1966 the regional high school and the 
regional technical institute were opened in a new facility in 
Canton, Massachusetts. The Technical Institute offered one and 
two year non-degree vocational technical programs at the post¬ 
secondary level. There were 93 students enrolled in the tedinical 
Institute's first class. 
The Willis-Harrington Act of 1965, referenced earlier, 
separated state-wide educational responsibilities from the single 
Board of Education to a segmental system. Ihe Act created a Board 
of Education with primary and secondary education oversight 
responsibility and separate boards accountable for the various 
institutions of public higher education. The legislation also 
created a Board of Higher Education \diich had general oversight 
and coordinating responsibilities for higher education in the 
Commonwealth including the authority to approve institutional 
requests to award postsecondary degrees. 
The regional school district was answerable to the Board of 
Education for operational purposes but had to satisfy requirements 
established by the Board of Higher Education for its post- 
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secondary programs. The Regional School Committee and its 
administrators sought formal degree granting authority for its 
postsecondary programs shortly after opening the Institute. This 
authority was permitted under the provisions of Chapter 74, 
Section 37A, MGL, which required approval by both the Board of 
Education and the Board of Higher Education. 
The Technical Institute was granted the authority to confer 
the Associate in Applied Science <AAS) degree in April, 1970. 
Starting with the graduating class of 1970, those candidates v^o 
met the requirements of the program in which they were enrolled 
were awarded either a certificate of program completion or an AAS 
degree. Permanent degree granting authority was granted to the 
Technical Institute by the Board of Higher Education on 
December 23, 1971, subject to periodic review to insure 
instructional quality. The school district, through its Technical 
Institute, became the only regional school district in the 
Commonwealth with authority to confer the AAS degree. 
The Technical Institute becane affliated with the New England 
Association of School and Colleges (NEASC) on November 15, 1972 as 
a candidate for accreditation. Application for accreditation and 
full membership in the NEASC was made and a self study conducted 
during the academic year 1977-78. Hie Institute was accredited as 
a degree granting institution in 1978 by the NEASC through its 
commission on vocational, technical, and career institutions and 
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received continuing accreditation in 1983. As enrollment grew, 
additional space was needed for both secondary and postsecondary 
programs. The Technical Institute moved into a newly constructed 
facility, separate from the high school but adjacent to it, in 
1976. 
From its founding in 1966 through 1978, operational funding 
for the Institute was tram categorical state vocational public 
school aid with the balance from local taxes. The state aid 
formula changed in 1978. In 1979, the Technical Institute was 
authorized to collect tuition from students. In 1980, Proposition 
2 1/2 limited town revenue raising capacity, and this in turn 
resulted in the elimination the local tax-based support by the 
school committee for the operation of the Institute. Changes in 
state aid and the loss of local support n^ant that student tuition 
would be increasingly required to carry the major burden of 
institutional support. 
Over the years 1966-84 the Institute enrollment grew to about 
500 students. By 1984 it awarded the Associate in implied Science 
Degree in nine program areas and certificates in two other areas. 
The certificate and degree programs and credit requirements follow 
in Table 3. 
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Table 3 
Blue Hills Technical Institute Academic Programs 
Program Credits (Minimum) 
Medical Assistant 
Dental Assistant 
Architectural Technology 
Electro-Mechanical Technology 
Electronics 
Civil/Structural Technology 
Diesel Technology 
HVAC Technology 
Advertising and Art Design 
Medical Laboratory Technician 
Data Processing/Conputer Programming 
78 
70 
70 
79 
66 
73 
73 
73 
74 
38 (certificate) 
36 (certificate) 
Hie Institute followed the clear mandate of its charter and 
the school district hy ertphasizing its vocational/technical, 
career occupational role. This mission was based on large part 
premise that further vocational training beyond high school opens 
greater occupational ojportunities than does a high school 
diploma. 
Hie Institutions Compared 
Leyland Medsker [1960] has noted that public two year 
institutions have developed in different ways throughout the 
lAiited States, though v^ere they have formed he finds the origins 
rather easy to categorize. 
The principal types that have developed 
are (1) the locally controlled and supported 
junior or community college with or without 
state aid, (2) the junior college or technical 
institute fully controlled and supported by 
the state, and (3) the two-year extension 
center of a four-year college or university. 
[p. 13] 
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Massasoit's origins are obvious. It is one of fifteen state 
supported regional TOinmunity colleges. However, not all of the 
state suj^rted community colleges were originally established by 
the Board of Regional Community Colleges. Holyoke Community 
College was founded in 1946 as a municipal junior college. It 
came under the jurisdiction of the state system in 1964. In 
addition, by a 1967 act of the legislatiore, the responsibility for 
the Springfield Technical Institute was transferred from the city 
of Springfield to the Massaschiisetts Board of Regional Community 
Colleges (MBRCC). The Institute was renamed Springfield Technical 
Community College and was to retain a primary emphasis on post¬ 
secondary technical education. The process by vdiich Springfield 
was brought into the state community college system was primarily 
political; the Regional Community College Master Plan did not call 
for two separate colleges in Itolyoke and Springfield. 
The MBRCC Master Plan did include a priority for a college in 
the near South Shore area of Boston, and specifically intended to 
take over a city-supported college in Quincy, Massachusetts [Deyo, 
1965]. It was in Quincy vdiere, after Holyoke became state- 
supported, the only remaining municipal junior college in the 
Commonwealth existed. This attempt to create a state supported 
community college in the city failed when Quincy chose to retain 
control of its municipal junior college. By defaiilt, Massasoit 
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thus becaine the cananunity college responsible for a large region 
to the near south and southwest of Boston as Quincy Junior College 
maintained its local focus. 
The Technical Institute, in contrast to Massasoit, was a 
locally controlled institution with state suK^ort. Much of this 
state siTOort originated with the federal government through the 
Vocational Education Act and was distributed under the authority 
of state statutes. Massasoit was one college in the system of 
public hi^er education, while the Technical Institute's purpose 
was tied to secondary education. Indeed, the law (Ch. 74, S.37A) 
v^ch authorized the creation of technical institutes, 
specifically based the justification for such institutions on the 
necessity of additional training beyond the secondary level: 
If a school committee or board of trustees 
of any industrial, technical, argriculturad., 
or vocational school subject to this chapter 
determines that sufficient need exists in 
such school for a coinrse or courses beyond 
secondary school level and designed to prepare 
students for greater opportunity for enployment 
in industrial, argricultural, and technical 
occupations, it may subanit in writing its plans 
for such course or coiorses to the Board of 
Higher Education. 
It is the same law which also provides for the awarding of 
the AAS degree. The extent to vdiich a local school district 
offers post secondary courses or programs is a decision of the 
local board or committee. 
94 
While the two institutions differed in regard to the locus of 
public control, they were also distinct in their educational 
programs. Massasoit specifically, and the regional community 
college system generally, chose from the outset to emphasize its 
coitprehensive educational program nature. The two year liberal 
arts program was designed for transfer to four year colleges and 
universities. However, even the occupational programs for those 
interested in immediate job training had a strong general 
education component, seeking a balance between the traditional 
liberal aurts studies and specialized technical courses. There was 
a deliberate attempt to avoid programs at the trade level, the 
training of skilled workers in specialized vocational programs. 
The Technical Institute, on the other hand, emphasized those 
programs where students would learn manual and technical skills. 
This programmatic entasis was the same as the regional high 
school where 75% of the courses in a program of study were to be 
directly or indirectly related to learning skills of a particular 
vocation. The Institute's avowed purpose was to develop 
technically competent individuals for immediate entry into the job 
market. Hie reason the Institute pursued post secondary technical 
programs was the purposeful avoidance of such programs by public 
community colleges, a policy vrtiich left a void in the range of two 
year programs available to citizens of the Commonwealth. Indeed, 
the academic departmental structure of the Institute as depicted 
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in its 1978 self study reflected this primary focus on skills 
training. Each degree or certificate program was organized in a 
separate department, but the traditional academic disciplines of 
English, History and the like were organized in a single "academic 
department". The NEASC recommended, and the Institute ultimately 
adopted, a separate department status for the academic 
disciplines, but the orginal organizational structxire is telling. 
Both Institutions opened in 1966, were publicly controlled, 
and offered programs leading to the associate degree. The 
enrollment at Massasoit with its comprehensive educational program 
was notably larger than the Technical Institute with its 
specialized vocational programs. During the years 1966 - 1984 
there was no competition or cooperation between the two 
institutions and, indeed, little contact. 
Two Characteristics of the Merger Process 
In the introduction of this chapter it was noted that the 
Massasoit/Blue Hills merger differed frcan the earlier mergers in 
the Commonwealth because it was characterized by public policy 
from the bottom up rather than top down. This meant that the 
participants in the merger had to accomplish the substantive 
aspects of the merger process; The development of a merger 
consistent with public policy as well as an agreement of the 
institutions involved. 
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In order to influence public policy the College and the 
Institute had to develop a rationale which e3q)lained the purposes 
of the merger, the relationship of the merger to the mission of 
the caramunity colleges, and finally the impact of this merger in 
the conduct of public higher education in the Commonwealth. 
Simultaneously, the institutions had to resolve those academic, 
personnel and financial issues that had to be settled in order to 
accomplish the merger. While these two processes occurred at the 
same time, it is possible to separate them for descriptive 
purposes. 
Public Issues 
Hie first contact between the Blue Hills Technical Institute 
and Massasoit Community College took place in January of 1984. By 
May of 1984 it was apparent that there was sufficient interest by 
both parties to proceed and to develop a rationale which would 
support the concept of the proposed merger. To that end, 
Massasoit Community College produced a docunent entitled "On 
Behalf of a Proposed Merger Between Massasoit Community College 
and Blue Hills Regional Technical Institute" which served as the 
basis of all subsequent public announcements regarding the merger. 
The paper was a straightforward rationale for the merger. 
The background statement provided that the negative inpact of 
Proposition 2 1/2 placed the Technical Institute in an imtenable 
long term situation regarding operational funding. 
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Four separate groups were identified that stood to benefit 
from the merger. The first was the Blue Hills Technical Institute 
and the seven towns in the school district which would provide for 
a continuation of postsecondary level technical education at a low 
cost and without a financial burden for the school district. The 
second, Massasoit Community College, would greatly benefit from an 
extended ability to meet the educational needs of South Shore 
residents. Ihe third group, the governing boards of education and 
regents, would find a workable solution to a nettlesome 
jurisdictional problem but which did not duplicate existing 
postsecondary programs. Finally, the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, which maintained authority over all these groups, 
had a strong concern for the State's economic development and 
would provide a continuity for an educational program which 
assisted in that growth [Massasoit Community College, May, 1984, 
p. 2]. 
The position paper was supplemented by letters to area 
senators and representatives fr<»n Gerard F. Burke, Massasoit's 
President, apprising them of the n^rger and soliciting their 
support. These coiranunications suggested six advantages to the 
proposed merger: 
1) To insure the survival of the Technical Institute, 
thus continuing services to the area students and, in 
addition, meeting the institute's financial commitment to 
bond holders; 
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2) To develop a strengthened comprehensive community based 
college to meet the needs of the growing high tech 
industry and South Shore areas; 
3) To provide Massasoit with additional classroom space in a 
populous part of its service area; 
4) To eliminate the duplication of post-secondary 
educational programs in the area and to place all public 
programs under the govemace of the State’s Board of 
Regents of Higher Education; 
5) To e:q>and programs and services currently available to 
Blue Hills area students beyond those presently available 
at the Technical Institute; 
6) To enhance Massasoit's curricnilum in the technological 
field. [Massasoit Community College, June 6, 1984] 
The above represents the public rationale behind the proposed 
merger. Yet, certain formal actions remained to be accomplished, 
including formal approval by the Blue Hills Regional School 
Committee and the Massasoit Community College Board of Trustees, 
approval by the Board of Regents of Higher Education, approval by 
both the House of Representatives and the State Senate, and 
agreen«nt by the Governor. While the process of securing the 
approval of these authoritative bodies was necessarily intertwined 
with the resolution of various inter-institutional issues, it is 
important to note that the approval of all these groups was 
essential in the long term for the success of the merger. Clearly 
the ultimate authority rested with the legislature and the 
Governor, but securing their approval was certainly easier by 
having affirmative votes from those groups with more immediate 
institutional and programmatic responsibilities. 
The Massasoit Community College Board of Trustees had a 
relatively easy decision to make. The prospect of merger would 
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carry little threat of financial adversity to the institution, if 
funding for the merger would be forthcoming from the state. The 
Board made the fundamental decision that the merger would proceed 
only with additional state appropriated funds to support College 
operations. The other considerations then had to do with the 
impact of a permanent branch campus on the routine operation of 
the college since the Board was convinced that the programmatic 
combination was a good one. 
The College administration was able to convince the Board 
that the complimentary academic programs of the institutions and 
the greater service to the constituent cirea would far outweigh any 
of the potential organizational disfunctions that might accompany 
the merger. The administration provided the Board with a plan for 
operating the branch campus in Canton. Of course, a great deal of 
informal discussion and debate took place behind the scenes, but 
this review of the issues never posed a threat to the possibility 
of merger from the M^sasoit perspective. Ihe Board's detached 
approach effectively delegated the authority for detailed 
negotiations to be handled by the College and other state 
administrators [James Slattery, personal comanunication, August 28, 
1989]. 
If an assurance of financial stability was necessary to 
secure the favorable opinion of the Massasoit Community College 
Board of Trustees, it is significant that an irreconcilable 
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financial problem lay at the base of the decision of the Blue 
Hills Regional School Committee. A brief review of the funding 
history of the Technical Institute is necessary to reach an 
understanding of the financial situation that confronted the 
Regional School Committee. 
William Dv^er was the founding Superintendent Director of the 
Blue Hills Regional School and was the major force behind the 
creation of the associate degree granting programs of the 
district. Mr. Dwyer's reputation was of a particularly skillful 
lobbying ability and of contacts with inflxiential legislators. 
Bill Dwyer was successful in convincing the Regional School 
Committee in the mid '60's and early '70's that there was a void 
in the level of technical public higher education in the 
Commonwealth. He asserted that additional education was necessary 
beyond a high school diploma, yet he saw a newly established 
community college system that did not provide for similar 
technical programs in its vocational component. Massasoit's 
curriculum was typical and reflected this non-technical emphasis 
in Ccureer programs. In pursuit of this postsecondary technical 
training objective. Bill Dwyer was able to exert some influence in 
the passage of favorable legislative action regarding funding for 
the district. 
In the early 1970's, the Blue Hills Regional School District 
received state aid under Chapter 74 of the M^sachiisetts General 
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Laws. This funding mechanism provided aid to regional school 
districts including their postsecondary activity but, notably, 
this formula funding approach did not distinguish between 
secondary and postsecondary vocational students. A categorical 
fifty percent reimbursement for expenditures to regional school 
districts was the norm. Thus, all of the technical education 
based regional school districts received fifty percent of their 
funding from the Commonwealth and fifty percent from local 
sources. At that time, there was no tuition charge made or 
permitted under the law. 
In 1974 a change was made in the Chapter 74 fimding formula 
to provide a sixty fi\^ percent reimbursement for postsecondary 
vocational education students vrtiile continuing a fifty percent 
reimbursement level for those in secondary programs. In the mid- 
1970's Bill Dwyer also lobbied to obtain legislative permission 
for postsecondary institutions offering technical education to 
charge tuition to students v^ch would not be factored in the 
funding formula. His objective was to provide financial stability 
for regional school districts with postsecondary programs by 
continuing a sixty five percent state reimbursement and coupling 
it with local tax support and a tuition charge to students. Bill 
Dwyer did not live to see legislation that permitted local 
collection of tuition (receipts) but, ironically, it was just that 
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legislation he favored so strongly that began the movement toward 
the long term financial instability of the Technical Institute. 
In 1978 the so-called Collins/Boverini Act changed again the 
formula funding process. It took funding for vocational education 
school districts out of Chapter 74 and made local school aid for 
all secondary schools subject to a Chapter 70 formula. Ihis 
formula had as its base a "student” and established a base of two 
for each technical student and a base of one for all non-technical 
students. For each dollar per student esipended in a given fiscal 
year, the state would reimburse the school district in the 
following year one dollar for each non-technical student and two 
dollars for eadi technical student. This funding base maintained 
the fifty percent advantage for vocational school districts in 
recognition of the greater cost of educating students in secondary 
technical programs; however, the additional fifteen percent for 
postsecondary vocational student subsidy was lost in the 
transition, thus placing postsecondary technical students once 
again on the same basis as secondary technical students. 
The Collins/Boverini Act acknowledged further that receipts 
were appropriate for collection at the local level, but such 
receipts were to be taken off the gross budget prior to the 
computation for reimbursement. The net budget was then used as 
the base for determining aid. In this way, the Commonwealth 
avoided reimbursing school district for that paurt of their budget 
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derived from local fees, but at the same time it meant that as 
local receipts increased as a part of the total budget, the 
relative level of state aid would decrease. 
The change in the funding formula enacted in 1978 was 
followed soon after by Proposition 2 1/2. The Regional School 
Committee's response to Proposition 2 1/2 was to cease using tax 
money frcan the towns to support the Technical Institute. Prior to 
Proposition 2 1/2, a single budget for the High School and 
Technical Institute was used to assess the seven towns in the 
district. Therefore, town meeting assemblies in the seven 
communities were not made aware of the budget amounts which went 
to support either the High School or Institute. This changed with 
the school coiranittee's action in response to Proposition 2 1/2, 
when separate budgets were presented for the High School and the 
Technical Institute. 
Through this action, the school committee made funding for 
the Technical Institute very tenuous. By assigning all local aid 
to the High School and diverting it from the Technical Institute, 
the committee created a situation in which an increase in tuition 
at the Technical Institute would result in a decrease in state 
aid. As the Technical Institute raised tuition levels in order to 
meet its operating e25)enses through the early 1980's, state 
support for the entire school district would proportionately be 
diminished. The school district would submit its total budget to 
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the state for reiiribursement yet reduce that gross budget by the 
tuition collected hy the Institute. Th\is state aid for the school 
district would be thereby reduced, idiich was passed on to the 
Technical Institute's operating budget. This downward spiral of 
more tuition revenue - less state aid - additional tuition 
revenue - less state aid - over time produced an untenable 
situation for the institute unless legislative relief could be 
found. 
In the face of this downward spiral of financial support from 
the state, the regional school district did not have the 
legislative acumen of Bill Dwyer. School District Superintendent 
Charles Brennan and David Malone, Dean of the Technical Institute, 
testified before the Legislatiire's Joint Committee on Education in 
1984 in support of a bill filed by a local legislator for separate 
categorical aid for the Blue Hills Technical Institute. David 
Malone recalls that they were not well received. They were 
questioned: "If you are a public institution and postsecondary, 
vdiy are you not in the community college system? If you are post¬ 
secondary and public, then vdiy are you taking Chapter 70 money 
earmarked for secondary education?" Representative Collins, House 
Chair of the Joint Committee on Education, advised them that the 
problem is for the Board of Education and a Board of Regents to 
decide vdiere support for the technical institute belongs. 
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A meeting was arranged with Board of Regents and Education 
representatives at the Board of Education offices and it became 
clear to David Malone that the Board of Education did not want the 
Institute included in Chapter 70 and that the Board of Regents 
considered the institute a vocational school and, therefore, 
subject to Chapter 70 fiinding and not a part of the community 
college system. As a result of this meeting, there was an attenpt 
to insert a separate lump sum line item for the Technical 
Institute in the higher education budget, but the attempt failed. 
The only regional school district in the Ccararvonwealth with an 
Associate Degree granting authority found itself without a home in 
either secondary or postsecondary education, and apparently 
without a political constituency as well [David Malone, personal 
communication, August 4, 1989]. 
It was the failure of this budget request in June, 1984 that 
precipitated vigorous efforts on the part of Charlie Brennan to 
accomplish the merger. In contrast to Bill Dwyer's successful 
legislative negotiating ability, Charlie Brennan was the ultimate 
administrator who worked closely with faculty and students in the 
day to day administration of the Technical Institute. He felt 
that the ultimate issue at hand was the continuation of the 
Technical Institute to provide students with a conpetent education 
and, secondarily, faculty and stedEf with continued enployment 
[Charlie Brennan, personal communication, August 22, 1989]. 
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This is not to say that all of the administrators in the 
school district supported merger with Massasoit Community College. 
Wilfred Savoie, then a program director but at the time of the 
merger the newly designated Superintendent Director, felt that the 
Technical Institute could be financially successful by changing 
its aM>roach to its educational programs. He wanted to emphasize 
evening and adult programs and to customize training programs for 
curea industries. He thought this arrangement would make the 
Institute financially viable over time [Wilfred Savoie, personal 
communication, August 4, 1989]. Unfortunately, his 
recommendations offered only a potential resolution of a real and 
immediate financial problem and would leave intact a rapidly 
escalating cost for Technical Institute students v^en comparable 
publicly supported community colleges charged only several hundred 
dollars in tuition. 
The school committee was not unanimous in its support for the 
merger. There was a desire expressed by several long standing 
members of the school committee to maintain control of the 
institute at the local level. In addition, these school committee 
members all had to face a local electorate and did not want to be 
perceived as giving away local assets to the Commonwealth. 
Several public trial balloons were floated among the electorate, 
most notably an editorial in a Canton newspaper vrtiich argued 
against the merger. It is significant that this editorial was 
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written in the Canton newspaper, the site of the school's physical 
plant. It was also the home of a vocal school committee nmiber 
v^o opposed the merger, Benson Diamond. In the following week's 
edition of the newspaper, there was a single letter from David 
Malone in support of the merger. There were no other responses. 
The editor of the newspaper subsequently advised David Malone that 
not even one telephone call was received in response to either the 
editorial or David's letter to the editor. 
This incident reflected a lack of constituent interest in a 
matter previously thought to be of substantive importance to the 
residents of the seven towns. At the time of the actual merger 
vote by the School Committee, Benson Diamond made the following 
observations to a reporter from the Brockton Enterprise: 
Benson Diamond also noted his informal poll Tuesday 
of local officials and residents found no opposition 
to the n«rger. The group of Harrison Road residents 
v^o have asked a lawyer to look into the legality of 
the merger never contacted him with their objections, 
he said. 
"There was not only no groundswell, there was 
nothing," Diamond said. "To those people most 
affected the merger, there is no feeling about 
it, one way or the other." [June 5, 1985, p. 27] 
As a result of this non-issue, the school committee was 
politically free to negotiate as good a deal with the Coiraionwealth 
as possible. 
The Blue Hills Regional School District was the only regional 
school district in the state to offer an Associate's Degree for 
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its technical programs. It is not unreasonable to ask if it is 
sensible for an aggregation of seven small towns, combined 
regionally for the primary purpose of technical secondary 
education, to offer the Associate in Applied Science degree. It 
appears in retrospect that the formidable leadership of Bill Dwyer 
led previous school committees to make the commitment to 
postsecondary education and to bolster that commitit^t by his 
substantive legislative lobbying ability. With his demise and 
with the changes in financial aid for the school district, the 
school committee emphasized its primary mission of supporting 
secondary education. 
The change in formula funding seriously hindered the 
operation of the institute, especially following enactment of 
Proposition 2 1/2. The School Committee created a financial Catch 
22 for the Institute when local aid was withdrawn and the mandate 
to become self supporting was initiated. It was the action of the 
school cxmomittee itself in response to a state level action that 
accelerated the financial crisis which ultimately resulted in the 
merger of the Technical Institute with Massasoit Coraniunity 
College. 
William Buckley, School Committee member from Holbrook and 
supporter of the merger, recalls that the school district simply 
no longer afford to operate the Technical Institute. As a former 
principal at Holbrook High School, he felt that local tax based 
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support for education should stop at the 12th grade level and that 
the towns could not support a 13th and 14th grade. Although there 
was a strong sentiment on the part of the Committee menibers to 
keep the Technical Institute, there were no financial alternatives 
available. When it became clear that a merger was likely if area 
residents were to continue to have postsecondary technical 
programs available to them, the focus of attention became the 
amount of money the district would receive for the Technical 
Institute assets [William Buckley, personal communication, 
August 31, 1989]. 
With the general consensus of the Blue Hills Regional School 
Committee and the Massasoit Board of Trustees that the process of 
merger should proceed with appropriate financial support from the 
Qammonwealth of Massachusetts, the next step in the approval 
process was the Board of Regents of Higher Education. The 
Chancellor of the Board of Regents at the time was John Duff, who 
has suggested that the Massasoit-Blue Hills merger could be best 
described as painless. From the Regents' perspective, there was a 
united local interest behind the concept of merger and in terms of 
public policy it made little educational sense to have separate 
associate degree institutions in the same general area. 
Additionally, Dr. Duff favored this merger because it represented 
an anomolous situation idiich would not create a sudden demand for 
additional satellite campuses for other colleges and universities 
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in the Commonwealth [John B. Duff, personal communication, 
June 5, 1989]. In a system of public higher education with twenty 
seven institutions, the Qiancellor must consider the precedent 
setting nature of sucii decisions, because other colleges and 
universities may wish to e3q>and in the same manner. Since a 
merger was distinct from the creation of a satellite campus, no 
precedent was set v^ch could be easily duplicated by the public 
colleges and universities. 
The Board of Regents supported the merger and there was no 
opposition to the action approving the combination. The local 
consensus regarding the advantages of the merger provided the base 
upon ^^ch this public issue could proceed. The area 
Representatives and Senators were all either in favor of the 
merger or did not oppose it in principle. With this combination 
of administrative and faculty support, local school committee and 
Board of Trustee support, and a singular lack of local controversy 
concerning the matter, the merger required only a legislative 
champion and a willingness by the state Secretary of 
Administration and Finance to resolve the financial issues yet 
outstanding. 
Senator Anna P. Buckley, a Democrat representing Brockton and 
several contiguoLS towns, had long been a strong supporter of 
Massasoit Community College. As a itesmber of the Senate leadership 
in various positions she was in an especially influential position 
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to move consideration of this merger. While she was convinced 
that the merger would be good for the college and the area's 
economy, she also looked for a public policy aspect of the 
proposed merger. She was familiar with the financial problems 
facing regional school districts throu^out the Commonwealth, 
primarily as a result of Proposition 2 1/2. She felt that one of 
the arguments v^ch could bolster support for legislation would be 
the potential of using this merger as a model for other actions 
concerning the assumption of regional school programs by community 
colleges in other areas of the Commonwealth. 
Senator Buckley had a programmatic perspective as well. She 
felt the technical couses and programs from Blue Hills would be a 
distinct addition to Massasoit's offerings, particularly for 
constituents. At the time the General Dynamics shipyard in Quincy 
was moving toward closure meant a large number of people 
would be out of work. An es^panded Massasoit would provide 
retraining for these and other people displaced by plant closings 
or other workforce reductions. These training programs in 
technical areas could be especially appealing to holders of union 
cards, family people in need of retraining to obtain gocxi jobs. 
The merger would provide an opportunity for people to advance 
themselves that would not otherwise be available to them [Anna P. 
Buckley, personal cornmunication, August 21, 1989]. There were, of 
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course, other legislators in support of the merger in 1984 and 
1985 or, if not in total agreement, who went along with the 
proposal. 
The Massachusetts legislature is often characterized as one 
v^ere a strong leadership group exerts substantial influence over 
the progress and prospects of legislation. It was, therefore, 
crucial that the college have the support of Senator Buckley. She 
was not only a member of the leadership in the Senate, but had 
established a strong working relationship with key members of the 
House leadership as well. With leadership support, legislative 
approval of the merger was quite likely. 
As a member of the legislative leadership. Senator Buckley 
and the local Brockton delegation also had a measure of influence 
over administrative executives as well, including the Secretary of 
Administration and Finance who had to resolve the financial 
aspects of the merger. The local delegation, \diich included 
Representatives Creedon, Kennedy and Mara, met with Administration 
and Finance Secretary Frank Keefe to convince him of the merits of 
the merger. The financial issues only remained to be resolved. 
How much would the Commonwealth pay for Technical Institute assets 
valued at five to eight million dollars, and vrtiich the 
Commonwealth subsidized at acquisition and in annual bond 
payments? 
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Althoijgh there were some allegations by the School Committee 
that state officials were trying to steal the Technical Institute 
for a minimal price, once serious discussion began the matter was 
resolved rather quickly. Chancellor John Duff presented the 
financial offer along with his public statement of support for the 
merger at the May 7, 1985 meeting of the School Committee. 
Chancellor Duff acknowledged that the Technical Institute belonged 
under the domain of the Board of Regents as a part of Massasoit 
Ccanraunity College. 
The financial proposal placed before the committee on May 7th 
was not an outright cash bi:^out but was tied to existing 
mechanisms of state aid to local school districts. In the first 
instance, the Commonwealth agreed to assume responsibility for all 
the district's remaining bonded indebtedness of $528,000 which was 
payable over a ten year period. The state also agreed to continue 
Chapter 70 funding in the annual amount of $700,000 per year even 
though it would not qualify for $340,000 of the money because of 
the loss of Technical Institute students. There was no ending 
date provided for this Chapter 70 funding so, conceivably, the 
school district could expect to receive this aid ad infinitum. 
There was also no guarantee this aid would, in fact, be 
forthcoming every year since annual appropriations by the 
Legislature were required [John Duff, May 7, 1985]. 
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There was no way the State coiild commit future appropriations 
hy the Legislature, a Constitutional prohibition. This lack of a 
guarantee of payment under Chapter 70 proved nettlesome: 
The board (School Committee) expressed skepticism the 
legislatiire would continue the flanding indefinitely. 
"None of us in this rocan can predict vhat will happen up 
on the (Beacon) Hill," said Chairman Gerard Baker of 
Westwood. 
"It will continue as long as the state continues to fund 
students at the technical schools, vocational schools," 
Duff replied. 
The issue of continued Chapter 70 aid could mean the 
difference between a merger agreement that would provide 
millions of dollars to the district, if the funds are 
appropriated indefinitely, or a deal that would yield 
little financial retiom, if the state cuts off the money 
in a few years. [Brockton Enterprise, May 8, 1985, p. 31] 
All of the parties understood the concern expressed by the 
School committee regarding the uncertainty of funding, but there 
was also a common understanding that nothing could be done about 
the matter except to proceed on good faith. With the acceptance 
of the financial offer, only one issue remained. 
Concern was expressed by the school coiranittee about the 
future use of the facility if it ceased to serve an educational 
purpose and wanted any final agreement to include a claiose 
reverting the facility to the district in such a case. Instead of 
a reverter clause, the district was given what amounted to a first 
option to repurchase the facility if the property ceased serving 
an educational function. 
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On Jime 3, 1985, the Massasoit Board of Trustees approved the 
merger agreement and the Blue Hills Regional School Cammittee 
likewise approved the agreement on June 4, 1985. The Board of 
Regents agreed to the merger on June 11, 1985, and legislative and 
gubernatorial affirmation followed quickly with the fiscal 1986 
budget act. 
Massasoit's President, Gerard Burke, was convinced that the 
programs offered by the Technical Institute were a perfect 
addition to Massasoit's academic program. A merger of technical 
programs with Massasoit's liberal arts and other career programs 
would lead to a truly comprehensive community college. However, 
Dr. B\irke, prior to his tenure as President of Massasoit Community 
College, had been a Professor of History at Boston State College. 
His personal eaqjerience in the merger of Boston State into 
UMass/Boston provided a clear foundation for one particular aspect 
of the merger: personnel. 
Institutional Issues 
Massasoit Community College faculty and professional staff 
are covered by a collective bargaining agreement with the 
Massachusetts Community College Council/Massachusetts Teachers 
Association (MCCC/MTA), an affiliate of the National Education 
Association. This collective bargaining agreement covers all 
fifteen of the Commonwealth's regional community colleges. The 
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faculty and professional staff at the Technical Institute were 
members of a different local of the MTA as well. 
Very early in the merger negotiations. Dr. Burke decided that 
the merger process would proceed only if all enployees of the 
technical institute could be guaranteed employment at least for 
one year after the merger. The Boston StateAJMass Boston 
experience was not to be repeated as it applied to the treatment 
of individuals. 
The issue then became salary and workload. The faculty 
workload at the Technical Institute more nearly paralleled a high 
school teacher workload than a college teacher workload. In 
converting the workload of Technical Institute members to that 
provided in Massasoit's Iftiion Contract, the Technical Institute 
faculty stood to achieve a notable workload reduction from 
approximately sixteen to eighteen classroom hours a week to twelve 
hours a week. Since this workload reduction would be a 
contractual mandate and would actually increase the need for 
faculty at the same enrollment level, the college could 
realistically expect to follow through on its guarantee of 
employment for at least one year. The same number of students 
were expected to attend the institute after the merger and with 
the faculty workload reduced, it was more likely that additional 
faculty members would be necessary to cover the same number of 
classroom houirs for the same number of students. Significantly, 
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this factual situation bolstered Dr. Burke's emotional commitment 
that the merger experience not be a repeat of the negative 
personal experience he and others encountered in the Boston 
StateAJMass Boston merger. 
The issues of salary, academic rank, and seniority are 
likewise sensitive issues. These issues had to be addressed with 
a clearly devised approach because it affected not only the new 
employment status of the Technical Institute employees, but 
Massasoit employees would also be affected by the employment 
standing awarded to the Technical Institute personnel. That is, a 
sense of fairness to both the new employees and existing employees 
of Massasoit Oarninunity College would have to prevail. 
In the first instance, M^sasoit administrators decided to 
consider the Technical Institute employees as a group rather than 
as individuals. This approach was taken for several reasons. 
Massasoit Community College had no contractual or other existing 
method of placing individuals on a salary schedule that weighed 
experience, degrees, and other considerations. Therefore, had the 
college chosen to enter salary and rank negotiations with 
individual faculty and staff members, there could have been a 
disparity created by the negotiation process itself among 
Technical Institute faculty members. There could also be a 
perceived difference among those hired as a result of the merger 
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and continuing Masscisoit employees. In order to avoid this 
individual negotiation process, a group consideration of salaries 
was chosen. 
Massasoit evaluated several alternative salary offers, but 
decided to propose an award to all professional enployees at the 
Technical Institute a 6 1/2% increase over their then current 
salaries. This increase was the same general increase that would 
be awarded to Massasoit faculty in the same year. By offering the 
same percentage increeuse as MCCC/MTA unit member, the College 
could maintain its fairness approach. 
•Hie 6 1/2% increase was applied to a base salary rate. The 
College chose to continue Technical Institute enployees at their 
Institute salary plus the base increase. By making an offer v^ch 
recognized their continued employment. College administrators 
realized that some Technical Institute faculty would be paid at a 
higher rate than some Massasoit faculty. There was no objection 
to this continuation of salary by Massasoit faculty or unit 
professional employees since the College had the contractual right 
to place newly hired individuals at any place on the salary 
schedule. 
Massasoit faculty considered this base salary plus 6 1/2% 
abroach fair, especially since this approach was consistent with 
the existing contract. Technical Institute faculty were 
considered "new hires." As new hires the Technical Institute 
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faculty had no accrued seniority; thus, vdiile there may have been 
some salary disparities between the Technical Institute faculty 
and the continuing Massasoit faculty, there was no long term 
threat to Massasoit faculty employment. The Technical Institute 
faculty would always be junior to the Massasoit faculty in terms 
of seniority. The approach to the salary issue violated neither 
the \mion contract nor employee morale. 
The Technical Institute faculty did not hold academic rank 
vdiile the Massasoit faculty held the traditional ranks from 
instructor to professor. Therefore, the Technical Institute 
faculty had to be given academic rank as well as being placed on 
the salary schedule. Ihe salary schedule was somewhat flexible so 
that a given salary woxild fall in two or three faculty ranks. The 
Dean of Academic Affairs at Massasoit awarded faculty rank based 
on degrees and e:q>erience after having first determined vrtiere the 
salary would fall in the MCCC/MTA salary schedule. Placement in 
acadsodc rank created no jMroblems since the salary issue was 
perceived as paramount. 
Paul O'Hara, President of the Technical Institute's MTA 
local, suggests that unit members had two primary goals: To 
maintain the postsecondary programs at the Institute and to 
continue the employment of faculty after the merger. There was a 
fear that the Regional School committee would make a financial 
decision and not an educational decision by trying to sell the 
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Institute's idiysical plant and land to the highest bidder. This 
perspective had an historical context because of the discussions 
over the previous several years concerning the cost to the seven 
towns to operate the Institute. There was little talk of the 
benefit of postsecondary education abounding at the time [Paul 
O'Hara, personal communication, September 17, 1989]. 
The merger with Massasoit was the only realistic alternative 
that would meet the unit's goals, and Paul O'Hara suggests this 
was the source of the near unanimity in support of the merger by 
the union local. The salary, benefits, tenure and seniority 
issues were resolved with relative ease, primarily becaxjse of the 
open process of discussion that existed between Massasoit and Blue 
Hills administration and faculty union representatives. While 
some anomalous problems arose, they were resolved through open 
communication and not permitted to become points of contention. 
Ironically, Massasoit President Burke's determined effort not 
to repeat the Boston State debacle was consistent with the 
approach taken by the union. Both factions wanted the n^rger to 
happen and found the recent Boston State e^qjerience sufficiently 
threatening to keep discussion about the issues open and above 
board. The Institute professionals also found that Dr. Burke's 
positive attitude and personal pledge to avoid the kind of Boston 
State situation he had experienced to be helpful in assuaging 
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their fears about the unknown [Paul O'Hara, personal 
communication, September 17, 1989]. 
Classified employees (clerical and maintenance) were 
similarly accreted to Massasoit's locals of the American 
Federation of State, County and Municipal Enployees (AFSCME). 
Jobs and salaries of Technical Institute classified were matched 
as closely as possible to those covered by the AFSCME contract. 
Although the process was somewhat more difficult because starting 
salaries were contractually prescribed, there were no major 
problems in converting Technical Institute enployees to Massasoit 
employment categories. 
Other personnel issues were resolved relatively easily for 
professional and classified enployees. The Institute enployees as 
public enployees were participants in the same retirement system 
as state enployees so there was no loss of retirement benefits. 
The state employee health insurance program was comparable to that 
offered by the Technical Institute and, in fact, provided the 
Technical Institute employees with a greater range of choices 
among health maintenance organizations (HMOs). All other 
conditions of employment including vacation and sick leave and the 
like were covered by the MCCC/MTA contract and were not 
negotiable. 
There was a single issue that created personnel problems at 
the time of the merger: accumulated sick leave. By considering 
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all Technical Institute enployees as new hires, the College gained 
significant flexibility in addressing the salary issue. However, 
as new hires, the Technical Institute enployees could not carry 
their accumulated sick leave frcan the Technical Institute to the 
College. The MCCC/MTA contract was silent on the matter and the 
governing authority became the rules and regulations promulgated 
by the Commonwealth, often referred to as the red book. The red 
book rules and regulations for personnel in the Commonwealth 
provided that employees of municipalities cannot carry earned 
vacation or sick leave credits to enployit«nt with the 
Commonwealth. In order to maintain the consistency of the new 
hire approach, the College would not permit Technical Institute 
enployees to bring accumulated sick leave to their Coiranonwealth 
employment. 
In addition, the College did not choose to negotiate with the 
existing MCCC/MTA over the accumulated sick leave issue as a 
matter of impact bargaining. The College administration feared to 
begin such a process would open the door to other negotiations 
with the Blue Hills faculty when all other sensitive issues had 
been resolved. The Technical Institute faculty, having secured an 
appropriate salary and reduced workload and equivalent benefits to 
their Technical Institute employment, chose not to pursue this 
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sole issue. Subsequent to the merger in 1989, the Union filed 
special legislation to carry forward accumulated sick leave for 
these employees. 
Summary 
The merger of the Blue Hills Technical Institute and 
Massasoit Cammunity college was amicably accomplished on August 1, 
1985. 1110 impetus for merger was local, and institutional issues 
related to the process had to be resolved before the proposition 
could be brought before the Executive and Legislative branches of 
government vdiich held final say in the matter. The power of a 
negative vote could have been exercised by any of the actors 
involved. In retrospect there seemed to be only two factions: 
those who favored the merger and those who were indifferent. Even 
student interest reflected this dichotomy, with those favoring the 
merger doing so because of the favorable cost reductions vdiich 
would accrue to them. There was some interest among those 
students approaching their second year to receive their degrees at 
a Blue Hills exercise, and this request was easily acccarplished. 
It was this local unanimity vhich made the approval process a 
relatively smooth one. Yet, too, the public policy aspect of this 
merger proved compelling, just as it did with the earlier public 
sector mergers that created Southeastern Massachusetts University, 
the lAiiversity of Lowell and the University of Massachusetts at 
Boston. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CC»JCLUSIC»J 
As Massasoit Community College was preparing for its eventual 
merger with the Blue Hills Technical Institute, College staff 
members contacted several out-of-state institutions that had 
recently undergone the merger process. All were quite willing to 
share information but the infontal advice was always similar; 
Mergers of public colleges are all different because of politics, 
and the experience cannot be generalized. Yet the above 
historical review of four public college mergers in Massachusetts 
suggests that this casual comment may be too glib. While it is 
not appropriate to propose a general theory of public sector 
mergers on the basis of four examples in a single state, it is 
possible to make some tentative observations that may be tested by 
future research. 
Describing public college mergers as political is 
tautological since the accomplishment of the merger requires 
political action. It is more helpful to identify the impetus 
behind the move toward merger. Is merger being proposed as a 
matter of public policy with institutional considerations assuming 
a secondary importance, or is the merger being initiated by the 
institutions with political action being focused on validating and 
ratifying the movemoit? This public policy-institutional 
prerogative dichotomy is useful as a first distinction in 
understanding public college mergers. 
The policy-institutional distinction also represents a change 
in focus from the literature currently existing in the field. 
Most analyses of merger focus singularly on institutional issues, 
and v^ile this concentration is iirportant, it seems to miss the 
larger context of public policy and the organization and structure 
of hi^er education in the political jtirisdiction. 
As a matter of public policy, the issue of merger appears to 
arise primarily as a function of the availability of public higher 
education to the residents of the state. One of the most 
consistent statements made by elected public officials in the 
research for this work was that the mergers provided greater 
educaticoxal opportimity to constituencies important to that public 
official. 
It is in this context that Governor Furcolo saw the 
importance of merging two textile schools and creating 
Southeastern Massachusetts Ikiiversity. While it was possible in 
that situation to point to the academically redundant institutions 
in geographical proximity, such an observation, ^diile factual, 
would have missed the primary public policy impetus toward merger. 
Governor Furcolo repeatedly commented that the merger was brought 
about to create greater educational opportunity to the citizens of 
Southeastern Massachusetts vdio had been poorly served by public 
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higher education. Similarly, the combination of the Lowell 
Technological Institute and the Lowell State College was seen as 
an opportunity to provide a more varied educational menu to the 
citizens of Lowell than could be provided the relatively narrow 
engineering and teaching fields available at the separate 
institutions. 
Ihe merger of Boston State College into the IMiversity of 
Massachusetts at Boston also reflected this public policy focus. 
There was a clear consensus among the political leadership in the 
Caminonwecd.th that this n^rger should be accomplished for reasons 
that advanced the standing of public higher education in the city 
of Boston. This merger was complicated because of institutional 
resistance to this combination, but this should not obfiscate the 
primary fact of deliberate state interest in the merger. While 
the immediate context of the merger of the two institutions was 
publicly stated as budgetary, the Coinmcaiwealth' s financial status 
was merely the precipitating factor in accomplishing the merger. 
The Massasoit Conmunity College-Blue Hills Technical 
Institute merger represented an instance of an institutional push 
toward merger. In this situation, the two institutions seeking 
merger resolved most inter—institutional issues before pursuing a 
public resolution of the matter. Ultimately, the issues of merger 
in this instance had to be resolved in the public forum. While 
the merger effort succeeded there because it could be demonstrated 
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that the combination of a community college and a technical 
institute provided greater opportunity for the region's constitu¬ 
ents, the justification put forward by M^sasoit Community College 
was institution related, that the College could accomplish its 
mission more effectively. Chancellor Duff concurred with this but 
took care to observe that this merger would not represent a 
precedent which would then be binding on the Board of Regents in 
consideration of future mergers. Senator Buckley, however, 
considered the paramount issue to be the greater availability of 
training options to her constituents and not the esq^ansion of a 
college for that sake alone. 
These four public sector mergers also reflected the trend in 
public policy toward higher education and the status of the 
state's economy at the time. The merger that created Southeastern 
Massachusetts Iftiiversity occurred at a time of e^fpansion of public 
hi^er education in Massachusetts, and funds were identified to 
accomplish this end. The merger process that created the 
University of Lowell began during a time of continued e:q>ansion of 
public hi^er education and stable state finances, but was 
accomplished in a year vdien state finances began a decline. Thus, 
promises were made about adequate funding for the new Ikiiversity 
of Lowell vdiich were realistic at the time they were made, but the 
decline in state finances in the late 1970's precluded following 
through with the promises made earlier in the decade. The merger 
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of Boston State College and Iftiiversity of Massachusetts at Boston 
occurred in a period vdien state finances were at a low level, and 
this fact provided the opportunity to accomplish a policy that had 
already been decided. The Massasoit Coaranunity College merger 
occurred at a time vdien the state economy was e:q:>anding rapidly 
and funds were available to meet the commitments made during the 
negotiation process. If the Massasoit merger appeared somehow too 
good to be true, one reason may be that state funding was provided 
to meet all commitments made during the negotiations for merger. 
The public policy-institution distinction is meaningful 
because institutions are significant participants in the public 
debate over merger, even if it is initiated by public officials. 
College officials must not only consider the relatively narrow 
institutional advantages and disadvantages in a proposed merger, 
but understand the larger context of public higher education in 
vdiich the merger is being considered. Institutional autonomy and 
self-interest may well be important as normal operating 
assumptions but could represent blinders in the public debate over 
a proposed merger. 
The public policy aspect of merger also looms in these four 
examples in the sense that in only one instance was there an 
identifiable institutional crisis. The textile schools in 
southeastern Massachusetts and Lowell, the State Colleges at 
Lowell and Boston, the Iftiiversity in Boston and Massasoit 
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Community College could have continued as publicly supported 
institutions in their own right. There appeared to be no 
institutional characteristics that led these institutions toward 
merger. Only the Blue Hills Technical Institute faced a financial 
crisis which propelled it toward merger. 
Yet while the descriptive word "crisis" does not apply, the 
roles of the institutions involved in the mergers that created 
Southeastern Massachusetts University, IMiversity of Lowell, and 
UMass/Boston were clearly changing from their original public 
policy intent. The textile schools were created to support an 
industry that had essentially vanished from the Massachusetts 
economy, and teacher's colleges were changing fr<xn the original 
normal school concept into liberal arts colleges. It is not 
surprising that in each of these instances the ccohbinations were 
made from rather narrow, specialized colleges into more 
diversified institutions. Even the merger of the Technical 
Institute into Massasoit Community College provided for an 
expansion of the mission of the coiranunity college, even though it 
was precipitated by a financial crisis. 
In this discussion of public college mergers, one must take 
care to consider the special status of institutions of public 
hi^er education in the public sector. Jferger of public colleges 
carries with it connotations different from what exists with 
mergers of other public agencies. If, for example, one was to 
130 
consider the merger of welfare departments or other functional 
arms of state government, the primary consideration would likely 
be the organizational structure cis a means to effectively achieve 
an objective and not as an end in itself. Yet in Massachusetts 
and probably throughout the country, public institutions of higher 
education have considerable autonomy and are perceived to be 
members of the higher education ccanraunity, not state agencies. 
Therefore, an instance of merger in the public sector appears to 
be one area where collegiate institutions^ autonomy meets issues 
of state government. As this study of four mergers in 
Massachusetts makes clear, the state ultimately holds the final 
say in matters of merger, although the institutions involved may 
influence the outcome of the public debate. 
Little can be added as a result of this work to the laundry 
list of characteristics noted in the literature as being 
meaningful in merger situations. However, several observations 
can be made regarding the Massachusetts e3g)eriences which may be 
important to those facing a potential merger. In the first 
instance, there seems to be no movement along a continuum of 
cooperation that leads to merger. Indeed, in the four cases 
studied, there was a singular lack of cooperative relationshij^ 
between the institutions merged. There is siirply no indication 
from this sample that cooperative efforts in the public sector 
eventually lead to merger. 
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Finance almost always plays a role in public policy 
decisions. In three of the four situations studied in this work, 
however, finance was less important than the public policy aspects 
of public higher education. The impact of Proposition 2 1/2 in 
the merger that created UMass/Boston appears more as a 
precipitating factor than a direct cause of the merger. It was 
only in regard to the Massasoit-Blue Hills merger that the local 
financial situation of one institution was such that it sought 
merger. The merger actually represented an incremental expense 
for the Commonwealth. It is not inconceivable to perceive a 
situation in ^^ch the dominant public policy issue is the 
limitation of public e3q5enditures (or revenue) rather than the 
level of public higher education. In such an event, financial 
issues may prevail. Consolidation mergers to reduce the operating 
cost of public higher education could be one outcome of such a 
debate. 
Surprisingly, academic programs per se did not represent a 
major part of the discussion in any of the merger situations. It 
appeared that the disposition of existing academic programs was 
less of an issue than the prospect of increased opportunity and 
expanded programs through the merged institution. Perhaps the 
most important academic aspect in the merger process was the 
change in public institutional purpose over time as a crucial 
factor in the consideration of merger. 
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other items such as faculty quality, reputaticai and personnel 
all were part of the institutional consideraticns that were 
required to make the mergers effective, but did not aK^ear to be 
inherently iitportant in any of the mergers except the Bostcxi State 
CoUege-lMass/Bc^ton coofcinaticxi. In retrospect, it ai^>ears that 
had the Bostcai State College cojimmity recognized the 
inevitability of merger with UMass/Boston, accoranodation may have 
been reached regarding these issues. However, the attempt to 
negate the possibility of merger led Boston State employees toward 
a strategy of attempting to exercise its negative vote in the 
public debate, haice the prospect of negotiating a favorable 
settlement was lost. 
Finally, one characteristic was important in all four mergers 
in the Conroonwealth: geograi^cal proximity. This spears more as 
a necessary precCTidition to the discussiOTi of merger rather than a 
characteristic of the merger process. If there was no 
geograj^cal proximity, mergers were simply not considered. Even 
in the UMass/Boston merger, there was no discussion of merger with 
other institutions outside the city of Boston. 
In summary, the first effort at understanding mergers of 
public colleges and universities is to understand the distinctioi 
between public policy and instituticxial prerogatives. It is also 
significant that these institutions participate in a major way in 
the public debate ccxiceming merger. When all is said and done. 
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it appears that the predominant factor in mergers of public 
colleges and universities is the accomplishment of public 
objectives rather than an acccmimodation of the institutions 
involved. 
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